
John E. Keeler.

CHRISTIANITY OLD AND NEW

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LECTURES GIVEN AT BERKELEY, CAL.
ON THE
E. T. EARL FOUNDATION

By
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TO

E. B. B.

PREFACE

To the auditors who two years ago kindly expressed their appreciation of the lectures to which they had listened by requesting their immediate publication, a word of apology is due in view of delay in the appearance of the present volume.

Change of substance there has been none, and the very slight change of wording and occasional expansion for greater clearness which have been effected might have been carried through in a comparatively brief time, had not other, and more imperative, duties intervened. It is hoped that the addition now of the essay entitled Old and New in the Characterization of Jesus may compensate for the delay, and in a sense bring the discussion down to date.

The issue which in 1911 had already begun to be drawn is today far more acute. More clearly than ever the world of today is called upon to choose between the gospel of Jesus, and the gospel

about Jesus, between a so-called 'liberal' Christianity, in which social ethics predominates, and a Christianity which promises a new and mystical relation of the individual with God, whether the means it offers for the attainment of this end be regarded as symbol or fact.

History affords the only adequate basis of judgment and we have sought to make clear the lines at least along which a historical judgment should proceed.

But the critic of the New Testament has a further task. If 'the historical Jesus' is to play any part in the 'religion of the future' criticism must vindicate the distinctive traits of his moral and religious character as the Church has received it. To what extent this is possible, and by what solvent the conflicting schools of critical opinion may be made to serve the end of a sober judgment, it is the object of the concluding essay to determine. Neither the Hellenistic title, 'Lord,' nor the Jewish title, 'Son of man,' nor both combined, exhibit all that primitive faith found in the person of Jesus. While the title, 'Ser-

vant,' has almost disappeared, the conception of Jesus' character and career as corresponding to that of the suffering Servant of Isaiah has left indelible traces in the earliest literature, and gives us another and indispensable means of definition.

If the present volume shall serve to set in clearer light before a wider circle the task of the historian of religion in general, and of the student of Christian origins in particular, its own existence and the author's hope will be justified.

B. W. Bacon.

Yale University, January, 1914.

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I

THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION AND HISTORIC TYPES OF CHRISTIANITY

I. To speak of "the evolution of religion" implies a conception of it as advancing in continuous change from lower to higher forms. In point of fact, we hazard the assertion that it not only has advanced, but is still advancing, and will continue to advance with the progress of culture and enlightenment. Our primary proposition is that the tendency of human progress is not to discard religion, but to deepen and refine it. However, this proposition will not command assent without careful definition.

Religion may be so defined as to incline us all to agree with that radical school of sociologists who classify it with the folkways that vanish with other delusions, poetic, and perhaps tempo-

rarily useful, before the advance of science. The definition of religion which I propose is that of Carlyle:

> "Not that to which in words or otherwise a man will give assent, but what he lays practically to heart and knows for certain concerning his vital relations to the mysterious universe and his duty and destiny there—this," says Carlyle, "is his religion."

"Duty and destiny" in the mysterious universe! The doctrine of evolution has brought changes unparalleled in the history of thought to our conceptions of "this mysterious universe" and our vital relations to it. Is it any wonder that our convictions of "duty and destiny" are changing, too? Only a dead religion, a religion imposed from without, cast in the unchanging moulds of the past, enforced under the other-worldly penalties of dogma, could fail to respond. Our religion is proving its vitality by changing in answer to new views of the universe. This is the real significance of that vast new alignment called by Vatican authority—and well called—'modernism.' But modernism

is not irreligion. It is an awakening to the need of religion of higher type and wider scope. It knows no limitation to Catholic or Protestant. Petty distinctions of sect and denomination are disappearing before the consciousness of an immeasurably more momentous difference cutting sharply across all sectarian lines: Is Christianity a living, vital organism, a spirit and instinct of religious truth destined to perpetual reincarnation in new and varied forms as the race advances? Is it an interpretation of duty and destiny modifiable without other limit than fidelity to the truth of the past? Or is it an unalterable inorganic mass, a system committed once for all to a divinely appointed hierarchy, or embodied in a miraculous book? That is the issue of Medievalism versus Modernism on which we of today are summoned to decide. The issue is indeed momentous. But our awakening to it is not an evidence of the passing of religion. Rather the contrary. We feel the need of confronting anew the problems of duty and

destiny. And till men cease to be concerned with these problems there will be religion.

There is room for sympathy, even on the part of modernists, with the zeal of the champions of established authority and the sharpness with which they have perceived and defined the issue. At their head stand the forces of the Vatican, launching successive bulls against the twentieth century, straining every ecclesiastical power to chain down the minds of men to the world-view of Aquinas, and to resist their efforts to reconstruct the social order. The ultramontane policy may be mistaken, possibly hopeless. But at least it is not blindly acquiescent. Instinctively it feels the atmospheric change and knows it portends momentous things.

It perceives conditions as they are, and has courage to define the issue on the true lines of cleavage. Rome may be reactionary, but it is neither cowardly nor foolish. It has appreciation, as we, too, should have, of the values at stake in days of changing faith.

That deepest and most vital thing in man, his conviction of duty and destiny, the meaning he gives to his relation to the mysterious universe about him—his religion, cannot be changed without touching the very springs of civilization, of the social order, of existence itself. But neither can it be discarded. Religion is not thrown off as civilization advances; it only becomes more subtle, more refined, lays hold more deeply on the inner fibres of our being. "Man is incurably religious," say the sociologists. "Religion belongs to human nature," says Benjamin Kidd. One can almost hear the sighs they heave as they admit it. Yes, so long as man is conscious of a personality at cross purposes with the universe, and is thus driven to seek adjustment to such purpose, or purposes, as he may find in it, he must in some sense be religious. The time may come when we shall cease to be inconvenienced by personality, with its hopes and fears, aspirations and ideals. We may become evolved into mechanisms. Then, of course, we shall have

gotten beyond religion. Economics will take its place. For the present, and so far as human foresight extends for the future, too, religion belongs confessedly to man's nature.

II. Our second proposition affirms as a phenomenon of history that religions may be classified under two principal types, according to the preponderance in them of the self-regarding or the altruistic impulse. Christianity combines the two.

In days of changing views regarding the mysterious universe and our relation to it we need feel no surprise at proposed reconstructions of religion. Man is incurably religious, but it makes a deal of difference of what sort his religion is. It may be debasing or uplifting, rational or superstitious: but so far as history reveals its development it inclines always to one or other of two opposite poles. Either it will be individualistic, setting up as the paramount ideal the perpetuation and welfare of the self; or it will be socialistic,

in the sense of seeking first the welfare of the group, larger or smaller—the tribe, the brotherhood, the nation, humanity, the kingdom of God.

For the purposes of the present discussion I shall use the terms "Nature religions" and "National religions" as if they covered the same ground respectively as "individualistic" and "socialistic." In the abstract such a classification might prove hard to justify; but for the particular period of the beginnings of our own religion it will be substantially correct. In the great melting-pot of the Roman Empire not alone the ancient distinctions of tribe and nationality were disappearing, but also the ancient national religions. They were fast crumbling under the combined onslaught of Greek philosophy and Roman cosmopolitanism. Such as refused to be universalized disappeared. And to universalize the old religions meant in most cases to make them center upon the individual and not upon the tribe or state.

Together with the decay of the na-

tional religions the early Empire witnessed a prodigious development of interest in the duty and destiny of the individual. Personality was the great discovery of the Socratic school of philosophy. It wrote over its portal the Delphic motto, "Know thyself," Γνῶθι σεαυτόν. But man cannot take himself as "the measure of all things," he cannot rise to a sense of the greatness of his own 'personality,' without raising questions, aspirations, longings, as to the destiny of this new-found jewel of life, this immeasurably precious thing called 'soul.' Not only its future destiny but also its present relation to the Infinite becomes a matter of vital concern.

We cannot be surprised, therefore, that when philosophy in the semi-popular form of the Stoic and Cynic 'diatribe,' the street-preachers' harangue, began to reach the masses of the early Empire, the immediate result was a vast renaissance of the old nature religions under the form of 'mysteries'; for these all centered upon the idea of personal redemption, and immortality by spirit-

ual union with the divinity. The mysteries of Attis, Osiris, Adonis, the cult of Mithra and the like, spread all over the Empire. And this is precisely what should have been anticipated. Individualistic religion is closely related to nature-worship. The human spirit, conscious of its frailty, instinctively seeks alliance with the boundless Source of life and power endlessly poured out in the phenomena of the living creation. The world of vegetation annually restored from death, the animal world, the world of moving heavenly bodies variable or constant in their orbits, all tell of boundless energy and life somewhere in store. Man aspires to union with the Soul (or souls) of the living world. He hopes thus to attain to larger, perhaps eternal, life for his own personality. Here the emphasis of religion is on *destiny.*

With social religion in all its forms, ancestor-worship, clan-worship, tribe-worship, national religion, the reverse is true. The individual seeks his well-being in the welfare of the group. The

emphasis is on *duty*. Individual religion, probably for the reason mentioned, seems to be historically rooted in nature-worship. It naturally tends toward mysticism. National religion develops ethics. In the one case the goal in view comes to be personal immortality, in the other it becomes the new social order of a redeemed race, a world-wide kingdom of righteousness, equity, and truth.

The struggle of religions in the period of the Antonines for supremacy in the Empire, in which Christianity, the ultimate victor, was but one of many factors, was fundamentally a struggle of the individual against the social type, and individual religion fell back for its myths and forms upon the ancient practices of nature-worship. Our contention is that Christianity combines both types, and by the perfection of this adjustment proves its right to be the ultimate world-religion.

Græco-Roman Christianity has been denounced as predominantly and even selfishly individualistic. Gibbon held it largely responsible for the downfall of

classic civilization. With greater justice Lecky, in his *History of European Morals,* blames rather that system of medieval other-worldliness preached in the name of Christ throughout the decadent Empire. The charge is given poetic form by a follower of Gibbon, who paraphrases the legend of the despairing death-cry of Julian surnamed 'the Apostate' for his fruitless effort to restore the pagan faith. Swinburne makes the Emperor's dying words an echo of his despair over the fading ideals of Roman imperialism and the decay of classic civilization:

Thou hast conquered, O pale Galilean,
The world has grown grey from thy breath,
We have drunken of things Lethæan
And fed on the fulness of death.

But the curious thing about these condemnations of Christianity as a religion so one-sidedly individualistic as to lose all altruistic interest in the welfare of the race, is that they completely reverse its basic character. For Christianity in itself, whatever the special developments that won the dislike of Gibbon

and Swinburne, and which centuries before had led the Roman populace to impute to the new sect a 'hatred of humanity' (*odium humani generis*), is certainly not at bottom an individualistic religion. It springs from a stock representing the extreme of the opposite, the social type. I mean Judaism, with its century-long rejection of any doctrine of personal immortality, and its systematic concentration of religious hope upon the 'messianic' idea, the faith in a righteous government of the world.

So far as there is just cause of complaint against any religion for the destruction of the magnificent fabric of classic civilization it seems to be far better expressed by Frazer in a chapter headed "Oriental Religions in the West," in that splendid work of comparative religion, *The Golden Bough,* Part II, *Adonis, Attis, Osiris* (1906). Frazer thus contrasts the national religion of the Empire with the flood of Oriental nature religions, mystery-cults, religions of personal redemption, which undermined it:

Greek and Roman society was built on the conception of the subordination of the individual to the community, of the citizen to the state; it set the safety of the commonwealth, as the supreme aim of conduct, above the safety of the individual, whether in this world or in a world to come. Trained from infancy in this unselfish ideal, the citizens devoted their lives to the public service and were ready to lay them down for the common good; or if they shrank from the supreme sacrifice it never occurred to them that they acted otherwise than basely in preferring their personal existence to the interests of their country. All this was changed by the spread of Oriental religions which inculcated the commune of the soul with God and its eternal salvation as the only objects worth living for, objects in comparison with which the prosperity and even the existence of the state sank into insignificance. The inevitable result of this selfish and immoral doctrine was to withdraw the devotee more and more from the public service, to concentrate his thoughts on his own spiritual emotions and to breed in him a contempt for the present life which he regarded merely as a probation for a better and an eternal. . . . . A general disintegration of the body politic set in.

Is it then possible to conceive of Christianity (!) as "a selfish and immoral

doctrine'' indifferent to the fate of the world if only the devotee may save his paltry soul from the wreck? That is surely far enough from the temper of him who said: ''He that would save his soul shall lose it, and he that would lose his soul for the kingdom's sake shall save it.'' Nevertheless all of us have experience of a certain one-sided individualism often accepted as true Christianity, wherein the very doctrine of self-devotion for the kingdom becomes a counsel of farsighted selfishness. We know that the teachings of Jesus himself can be so interpreted as to deserve the epithets Frazer applies to the Oriental religions which invaded the Empire. The aspiration after personal salvation may take forms to which the epithets ''selfish and immoral'' are but too justly applied. The period of the Decline and Fall had superabundant experience of that unsocial tendency.

Turn for a moment to the history of imperial persecution. Why should the age of the Antonines, that century of unparalleled good government, under a

succession of world-rulers of the noblest type, beginning with Trajan the hero, and ending with Marcus Aurelius, philosopher, emperor, and saint, have been a century of war to the knife against our nascent faith? Rome broke all her age-long precedents of toleration to visit this single Oriental religion with bitter persecution. It maintained the hostility two hundred and fifty years. Why was this? What made Christianity so different from the other Oriental religions of personal redemption?

A modern instance will help us to understand the irrepressible conflict. Look across the Pacific at what the national religion of Shinto has done for Japanese loyalty within the last ten years. One may realize from it what a flourishing national religion might have done for classic civilization and the world-empire of the Cæsars. It has secured for Japan what Roman emperors endeavored to secure and failed. The worship of the 'genius' of the emperor, demanded by Rome in the second century as the test of fealty to

the ideals of the world-commonwealth, was refused by the Christian as an act of disloyalty to the King invisible. He "feared not their fear, but sanctified in his heart Christ as Lord." But to men like Hadrian and Marcus Aurelius, emperor-worship was far more than a tribute to their personal vanity. It was not a mark of servile adulation, but a vow of fealty to the imperial ideal. Men who refused it would be guilty in the eyes even of a Tacitus of "hatred of the human race" (*odium humani generis*). If, then, Christianity was singled out for persecution alone among the many Oriental religions of personal redemption, this was not because of their common trait of "indifference to the public welfare," although this alleged common trait of unsocial interest made all alike "contemptible" in the eyes of the true Roman imperialist. It was because of something distinctive and exceptional. For Christianity, however in the Greek-speaking world it might be clothed with the ritual forms and sacramental ideas of the Hellenistic religions of individual

redemption, however it might seem pivoted, like the mystery religions, on the hope of personal immortality, was in its origin and fundamentally, as I have said, an offshoot of the most intensely nationalistic of all tribal and national religions. Judaism, the only national religion which survived the destruction of the ancient world-order in the conquests of Alexander and Rome,—Judaism has actually outlived down to our own time the national religion of the Roman Empire itself. And Judaism is nationalistic to the core. Before it took over from Persian and Hellenistic thought the doctrines of individual immortality and the world to come, it made national well-being its exclusive ideal. More than a century ago this phenomenon caught the attention of Warburton and drew from him the paradoxical argument of *The Divine Legation of Moses.* The Egyptian is the Jew's nearest neighbor. And the hope of life after death is the very essence of the religion of Egypt. The religions of Persia, Babylonia, Syria, were filled with it.

But the prophets of Israel not only ignored it; they placed it under the ban. To them it savored of nature-worship. The weeping for Adonis, the nature-god who dies and rises again, by union with whom the human spirit attains immortality, was as great an abomination to Ezekiel as Christianity to Tacitus. Later, it is true, under Persian and Greek influence, after the national life had become a second time extinct, Israel's doctrine of the kingdom of God became rapidly universalized, and more and more transcendental. The kingdom of God ceased to belong to the things of this world, and was relegated to another, an ideal "world to come." Christianity in breaking down the last barrier between Jew and Gentile, in making humanity the heir of the Abrahamic inheritance, and at the same time making that inheritance transcendental, was simply following the lines of manifest destiny. Judaism itself had taken many strides along this road. But however universalized, the ideal of the kingdom of God was too deep-rooted in the teachings of

Jewish prophets and the heroic sufferings of Jewish martyrs to lose its identity by mere fusion with the Græco-Roman ideal of the Commonwealth of Humanity. Fusion there has been; but in the process it has not been the classic ideal which absorbed the Jewish. It has been the Christianized Jewish which took up and revitalized the classic. Not Rome but Jerusalem has become for us the type of the "Eternal City." While the Empire still stood at only the beginning of its decadence, Augustine was writing his *City of God,* and Christians throughout the western world were sending forth their "Alleluia Perenne":

Sing Alleluia forth in duteous praise,
Ye citizens of heaven, oh, sweetly raise
An endless Alleluia.

Ye powers who stand before the eternal Light,
In hymning choirs re-echo to the height
An endless Alleluia.

The Holy City shall take up your strain,
And with glad songs resounding wake again
An endless Alleluia.[1]

[1] From a Latin hymn of the fifth century.

Bernard of Cluny in the twelfth century still has a social ideal which matches the world-patriotism of Virgil and Seneca. Only the 'messianism' of Virgil has been transcendentalized in its turn, like the 'messianism' of Isaiah. To Bernard there is still a

> . . . . sweet and blessed country
> The home of God's elect;
> A sweet and blessed country
> That eager hearts expect.

But the city of his dreams is not a heavenly Rome. It is a heavenly Jerusalem.

Nevertheless, if medieval Christianity thought of its 'New Jerusalem' only as an other-worldly, transcendental realm, which the slow lapse of the ages has lifted ever further into the dim unrealities of cloud-land, modern Christianity has brought its compensations. For modern Christianity is tending back with tremendous force toward the ancient Hebrew ideal. It retains the cosmopolitanism of Rome, but has the concrete practicality of Jewish messianism. The New Jerusalem of our modern hope is

the reconstructed social order of the prophets; not an ethereal paradise for disembodied souls, but a city that hath foundations, that comes down out of heaven from God, and is realized on earth among men.

We point, then, to the singling out of Christianity for persecution among the many Oriental religions of personal redemption as proof that the threat which it offered to the social ideal of the Empire was not merely negative like theirs, but positive and aggressive. The starting-point of our religion was the doctrine that Jesus is the *Christ*. And what is a 'Christ'—a Messiah—if not the representative and leader of a *social* ideal? Whatever individualistic ideals may be superadded out of the profound and mystical doctrines of the Oriental religions of incarnation, redemption, resurrection, whatever Paul did toward Hellenizing the faith, Christianity remains from its foundation ethical and social. This is the key to its long and bloody warfare with the Cæsars over the title 'Lord,' allowed by

it to none but its own Christ. Imperial Rome, which had only contempt for the "oriental superstitions" of Attis, Adonis, Osiris, Mithra, and the like, had equal contempt for Christianity. If against Christianity alone it decreed a war of extermination the reason lies here: The other redemption religions acquiesced in Rome's claim to universal loyalty in the interest of the world's welfare. Christianity alone rejected it. For Christianity alone had a social ideal for the race, irreconcilable with Rome's. Domitian was the first emperor to make war with Christianity a clearly defined policy of the Empire. His charge against it was loyalty to a hostile *political* ideal. The brunt of the attack was borne by the little 'caliphate' gathered around the 'kindred of Jesus' (*desposyni*) in Jerusalem. It is none other than Domitian who first decreed that imperial edicts should take the form: "Thus wills our Lord and God" (*Sic vult dominus et deus noster*). Christian feeling toward these "names of blasphemy" and the city "drunk with

the blood of the saints and martyrs of Jesus'' may be learned from the contemporary Book of the Revelation of John. A slightly earlier writing bearing the name of Peter encourages the Pauline Christians of Asia Minor to stand fast in the ''fiery trial,'' meeting the emperor's demand fearlessly, but with the quiet determination to ''sanctify in your hearts Christ as 'Lord' '' and be loyal unto death to the hope reserved in heaven until his coming. The incompatibility between Empire and Church was real. God Himself had made the crucified Friend of publicans and sinners ''both 'Lord' and Christ.'' Loyalty to a divinely reconstructed social order was inborn in our religion. It was diffused through every fibre of the Church by the blood-bath of the first three centuries. It is there to stay as long as Christianity endures.

III. It is in view of this historic origin of Christianity, combining the two great factors traceable in the evolution of religion, that we must prepare

to consider modern proposals for its reconstruction arising out of changed views of the order of nature. We recognize reasons for change, but affirm the improbability of any of lasting benefit which disregards the vital facts in the nature and history of our religion, in particular its adjustment to the two antithetic poles, the individual and the social ideal. Change is indispensable to life. But degeneration as well as progress is covered by the term. We live in a time of the reconstruction of ideas rapid beyond precedent, revolutionary, irresistible. Because our religion is living it changes with our conceptions of the universe and our relation to it. If it were dead it might be stationary; not otherwise. What, then, shall guarantee us amid the proposed reconstructions of Christianity that we be not led off into some by-path, sacrificing the immeasurable values of the historic faith? Some, indeed, hold it the policy of safety to close eyes and ears to all that savors of modernity and cling with dogged obstinacy to whatever may be saved of medie-

val forms. That, however, is deliberately to adopt a perpetually losing strategy. Scholarship knows no guarantee of conservation but the historical method. To appreciate our religion in its living, vital, essential factors we must understand it genetically, that is, in its development. When we know the principles of its growth we shall be able to judge of the proposed reconstructions that are commended to us, whether, and to what degree, they represent the line of historic advance. It is in this interest of continuity that I speak. As between modernist and antimodernist I have no brief to plead. The critical historian loses all authority the moment he becomes a partisan. But the historian of religion cannot be a historian at all without the recognition of change—yes, of evolution; for that term is one which, however exposed to prejudice, really stands for a reasonable religious faith. Not mere kaleidoscopic 'change,' but 'evolution' is the province of history. And if there has been an evolution of anything, there

has been an evolution of religion. As in other fields so here, there are periods and phenomena of degeneration; but they are less marked than those of development. The practical service which we ask of the critic of Christian origins is that he should enable us to discriminate between degeneration and advance. Only the most scientific methods of critical research can be trusted to guide us here. We must learn what has been distinctive and vital in this most aggressive of all aspirants to be the predistined and final religion of the world. Is Christianity essentially a socialistic or individualistic religion? Or does it combine in indissoluble union the vital elements of its Jewish and its Hellenistic ancestry, the mysticism of the redemption religions with the ethics of the Kingdom of God?

Our age has been prolific of attempts to reconstruct theology. And this really means the reconstruction of Christianity; for theology is simply the religion itself reduced to logical order; and in the long run practice must follow

theory. Twenty years ago when Joseph Le Conte wrote his splendid vindications of theistic and Christian evolution, called *Religion and Science* and *Evolution and its Relation to Religious Thought,* we were still in the throes of the great debate whether it was or was not compatible with Christianity, or even with any theistic faith, to admit the theory of evolution as an explanation of the physical creation. Recent as that time was, measured by mere years, we are already chiefly puzzled to explain why all enlightened men did not take the same views as Asa Gray and Joseph Le Conte. We find it hard to understand that any thoughtful man should have failed to see that evolution by the progressive operation of inherent uniformly operative causes, is not necessarily mechanical, materialistic, or fatalistic. Evolution conceived as a mode of immanent divine action, is now recognized to be at least as worthy of an all-wise, all-loving Father of our spirits, as the medieval conception of fiat-creation. But long ago in Europe,

and more recently in America also, it has come to be recognized that evolution involves other reconstructions than in the field of the physical creation. Criticism investigates the history and literature of religion, and criticism confesses to the same principle of evolution. That does not mean that biblical critics are atheistic. Individual critics, like other men, have had their bias; and there have been periods when the general bent was materialistic. Treatises have been written on the Evolution of Religion, or the Psychology of Religious Experience, which seemed to take it for granted that the truth or falsity of a belief could be determined by the mode of its attainment. We have had arguments of this type: Humanity has reached its theistic world-view through the devious paths of primitive folkways and nature-myths. Argol, the theistic world-view is a delusion. This is the logic of the country school-ma'am, who gives the child arithmetician a zero mark if the answer, true or false, be not obtained

according to the method set down in the book.

More often the application of the evolutionary principle to the history of religion has been made in devout conviction that the development of religious faiths and moral standards through inherent, rational causes is but a mode of divine operation in the spiritual creation, an evolution of the sons of God. And the future is with men of this type of thought. Outcry there is against the temerity of applying to the Scriptures the same critical methods as to all other ancient records and literatures. Critical results will be cried down. There is, and will continue to be, strenuous resistance to applying the doctrine of evolution in the spiritual realm. But the fact remains. Slowly, surely, irresistibly, criticism, the science of the history of thought, advances, correcting its errors, reducing its differences, achieving its scientifically accepted results. There is pathos, there is almost heroism, in the frantic resistance of those who have pinned their faith to the old order, be-

lieving that the Bible can no longer teach the true path of duty and destiny unless its history and doctrine be as miraculously free from the human frailties of other contemporary records and teachings as its astronomy and geology were once believed to be. The resistance moves our sympathy, but its only effect on the results is to make them more sure, more carefully tested, more scientific, than before. And the scientific results are not open to dispute. Bible history is *not* free from legend, bible philosophy is *not* free from myth. Like the natural science of the biblical writers they are not born out of due time. They are the history, the ethics, and the philosophy of the particular writer's age and environment, and must be distinguished from our history, our ethics, and our philosophy. Prophets and holy men of old spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. But the teaching of God did not overreach itself. It did not outrun the times. The truth which these men saw, and which inspired them to undying speech and action, was seen under the

thought-forms of their own age, expressed in the language of their own people. God's word was line upon line, precept upon precept. If we would have *critical* history from bible narrative, we must apply to it the same critical processes we apply to other records of the time. If we would have a *philosophical* construction of the events, we must put our own interpretation upon them and not simply borrow that of the narrators. We must use the thought-forms of our time, as they used the thought-forms of theirs.

Most futile of all is the attempt to draw arbitrary lines across the page and say: Myth and legend may be admitted to exist in Genesis, but not in Exodus; the miracles of Samson may be legendary, but those of Elisha are fact. If we apply the standard critical tests in Judges, we must apply them in Second Kings; if we apply them in the Old Testament, we must apply them in the New. We cannot yield up the vision of Elisha's servant to the tender mercies of the literary critic, and withhold that

of the Transfiguration. We cannot say the visible ascension of Elijah to heaven may have been fabulous, and exempt from critical tests Luke's story of the visible ascension of Jesus. Shall we, or shall we not, admit scientific enquiry? The way of the Vatican and the way of the modernist are before us; the authority of dogma, or the authority of evidence. But if we choose the latter we cannot stop halfway. We must be prepared to find many a narrative discredited, many a doctrine traced to misconception.

Remember, we are to be led by no prejudice either for or against what has been believed. Every consideration that has truth must receive acknowledgment to exactly that extent; but other considerations simply have no weight. There is indeed a relative freedom from contemporary error and superstition that comes to souls consecrated to a lofty purpose, inspired by a vision of the divine ideal. Men like Jesus and Paul rise superior to current superstitions of their time. To that extent religious in-

spiration indirectly improves scientific perception. Jesus contemns the prognosticators and bids men read rather the "signs of the times." He stigmatizes as "evil and adulterous" the morbid craving for miracle, and handles the law and the prophets with a spiritual insight into their eternal values that puts to shame the servile, scholastic pettifogging of the rabbis. To that extent he is *scientifically* in advance of his age. Paul also seems almost to anticipate modern criticism. He has a sense of ethical values which teaches him that the spectacular endowments of the Spirit by which the Corinthian believers set such store, "miracles," "tongues," "prophecies," were ephemeral and worthless as compared with the abiding graces of the soul, faith, hope, love. This superiority of Jesus and Paul to their times is marvelous. But it is not magical. It is a religious, not primarily a scientific, superiority. Jesus has no magical *fore*sight of God's purposes. He has *in*sight into God's nature. The people ask him, "When will the kingdom come?" and

he tells them frankly he does not know. They ask him, "What is it?" and he tells them from his inward experience: "It is being sons and daughters of the Highest." So far as strictly scientific knowledge is concerned Jesus and Paul stand on a level with their contemporaries. It is so regarding the creation and its expected end. It is so regarding demons and their supposed relation to calamity and disease. The superiority of Jesus and Paul is religious. Demons there may be, "gods many and lords many." This is their belief as well as that of their contemporaries. Yet they are free from contemporary superstition. For, as Paul continues, "*to us* there is one God the Father, of whom are all things, and one Lord Jesus Christ through whom are all things." We sink back into the very bondage of the letter from which Jesus and Paul would set us free, if we make of their utterances an external standard, instead of a guide and incentive to draw for ourselves from the eternal springs of life and truth. "Who is Paul, or Apollos, or Cephas,"

says the Apostle, "but ministers through whom ye believe?" "He that believeth in me," says Jesus, "believeth not in me, but in Him that sent me."

This, then, is one of the vast, slow changes that have overtaken all our views of the world since we began to think in terms of evolution. We have begun to look *through* the biblical writings *at* the spiritual life which lies behind them, and of which they were the product and flower. We have begun to appreciate how vital a distinction that is which our fourth evangelist puts in the mouth of Jesus in rebuking the arrogance of the scribes: "Ye search the Scriptures because ye think that in them ye have eternal life; and they are they that testify of me, and ye would not come unto me that ye might have life." It is largely due to the application of the evolutionary principle in the domain of spiritual life that we have begun to understand what the fourth evangelist means by the eternal Word, the Logos. We have become students of the history, psychology, and philosophy of religion,

using its literature for the "testimony" it bears to the Spirit of God in man, working with God through all the dark generations of the past, brooding over His spiritual creation yet to be. We have begun to see the glory of the living, eternal Word, "the Life that was manifested," the Life of God in man.

And from this new treatment of Scripture, objective, historical, scientific, critical, but passionate in its love for the truth and devotion to it, has grown the deep sense of need for restatement of our Christian faith. On the one side is medievalism, strengthening itself for dogged resistance; on the other modernism eager for paths untried. Louder and louder sounds the cry for theological reconstruction. And the cry meets its response. There are proposed reconstructions of Christianity which follow the ethical type, and other proposed reconstructions which follow the individualistic and mystical. But here is a significant fact. Of all the proposed reconstructions of our faith none hopes for the assent of the thinking world that

is not regarded, at least by its own advocates, as *historical.* Each aspires to be in some sense a restoration of the inspired past. Both alternatives of proposed reconstruction, the ethical and the mystical, profess to rest on history. History, then, must be their judge.

IV. The fourth and final proposition for our consideration today may be briefly stated. It is a defense of the jurisdiction of the court. The alternative types of reconstructed Christianity which appeal to the acceptance of thoughtful men today are the Ethical and the Mystical. Both appeal to history and must be judged by it. In selecting concrete instances we must mention specific names; but they are used as illustrative, and will be recognized as typical.

One of the weightiest utterances of the retiring president of our greatest American university was published not very long ago (October, 1909) in *The Harvard Theological Review,* under the title, "The Religion of the Future."

President Eliot's reconstruction presents the distinctive type of what has claimed for itself, and has sometimes been accorded, the honorable name of 'Liberal' Christianity. To him the mystical doctrines of personal religion, the doctrines of incarnation, atonement, immortality, represent mainly "pagan" accretion. To restore to Christianity its true message for our times we must trace it back (thinks President Eliot) to its "Hebrew purity" in the ethical teachings of Jesus. As for what are termed 'the consolations of religion' they will be mainly found in

> . . . . a universal goodwill, under the influence of which men will do their duty, and at the same time promote their own happiness. The devotees of a religion of service will always be asking what they can contribute to the common good. . . . . The work of the world must be done, and the great question is, shall it be done happily or unhappily? Much of it is today done unhappily. The new religion will contribute powerfully toward the reduction of this mass of unnecessary misery, and will do so chiefly by promoting goodwill among men.

Of the nobility of this ethical ideal there can be no question. It certainly has justification in history, as we have seen at least in a part of the history. It may rightly claim to reflect in large degree the teaching of Jesus, while it goes almost more than half way to meet the Reformed Synagogue and the liberal Ethical Society. But can we with historic truth call that Christianity which passes lightly over the doctrine of the person of Christ, the significance of his life and work regarded (to use Hegel's phrase) as "a representation of the divine idea"? Can that really be 'the gospel' in which there is not one word of what Paul describes as "the ministry of reconciliation committed unto us" as ambassadors for God, "how that in Christ God was reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing unto men their trespasses"?

No; President Eliot's Religion of the Future is good as far as it goes, but it does not touch bottom. By strange coincidence a protest almost violent in character is raised simultaneously against

the proposed new type of Christianity. From Germany and Scotland comes the positive assurance that the 'liberal' reconstruction has already been tried and found wanting. Under date but three months later than President Eliot's article, Doctor K. C. Anderson presents in the *Hibbert Journal* (January, 1910) the indictment against it of a new and clamorous school, the Idealistic Monists of Germany. The Monists cry out against the hypocrisy of the "Jesus-worshippers" as they term them, those who have stripped the gospel story of its supernaturalism, and yet make God in Christ the object of religious devotion. Dr. Anderson entitles his article, "The Collapse of Liberal Christianity," and in that of a year later (January, 1911) called, "Whitherward? A Question for the Higher Criticism," he argues—I quote the language of the editor's summary—"that the Higher Criticism has proved entirely destructive of the historical basis of the Gospels; but this result, though fatal to Liberal Christianity, only serves to free

the religion of Christ (i.e., abstract Christhood) for a deeper and fuller spiritual expression than it has received heretofore."

President Eliot and Doctor Anderson represent typically extreme views of what the Christianity of the future is to be. But both appeal to the same data, the results of historical criticism. Neither view would be of itself alone a matter of vital importance, but as symptoms of the great change that is taking place in our religion, confronted as it has come to be with the philosophy of evolution, they are vitally significant. They prove that our religion is preparing for a new and great readjustment, as when in medieval times it adapted itself to the philosophy of Aristotle. The vital power is present. Is there virtue and wisdom sufficient in the historico-critical study which the century just past has lavished upon Christian origins, to judge between these proposed reconstructions and determine the true line of historic advance? Shall we have a reconstruction that will stay, because

made in the historic line of growth? That is the question to which I shall apply myself in the two succeeding lectures.

II

NINETEENTH CENTURY LIBERALISM

In the preceding Lecture two types of modern Christian thought were briefly referred to. According to the views of the Idealistic Monists, the results of criticism applied to the records of the Christian faith have been entirely destructive. Nothing whatever has survived but myth. This, however, is declared to be well; because religion will be freer when it concerns itself only with ideas, regardless of the course of history. The individual soul will stand face to face with the Eternal that speaks to its own consciousness. Concrete reality is at best the conditioning background of our development, it may be an impediment. Let us seek with the mystics to perfect the individual soul. Let us with Nietzsche deify this individual personality that buds at last upon

the stem of biologic evolution. Leave to humanitarians the improvement of social conditions.

According to President Eliot, on the contrary, historical criticism has destroyed nothing but worthless myth and legend. It has done us the incalculable service of restoring the concrete historic fact. A mist of dogma was at first thrown off by speculative minds such as Paul's. Later, mounting and expanding it enveloped and almost hid from sight the unadorned form, the plain and sublimely simple precepts, of the mechanic Teacher of Nazareth. This transfiguring cloud criticism has at last dispelled. Christianity is restored to its "Hebrew purity." Little remains, the author admits, of the so-called 'consolations of religion.' The Religion of the Future must abandon the attempt to adjust individual interests and destinies to the movement of the cosmic Soul. Ethics will replace mysticism. The outcome will still be 'Christianity,' because the teaching of Jesus will form its nucleus. His example will remain the

best, his leadership will evoke the highest, most enduring loyalty. The Sermon on the Mount and the Lord's Prayer will remain the classic monuments of noble and humane aspiration, and the Teacher whose principles these embody will remain humanity's social Messiah, an example of the 'Christ that is to be.' Here is an ideal of individual duty and of (racial) destiny. If religion consists of morality lit up by emotion, we have here the emotion also, the sentiment of pathos and loyal devotion to an ideal. Is it not ungrateful, is it not selfish, to ask more? Take this as historical Christianity—the religion of Jesus—brought down to date, and what more can we reasonably ask?

First of all, it is true that recent research has done much to dispel the nimbus from the central figure of the Gospels. Criticism has largely restored the portrait of the Historic Jesus. Perhaps I may claim the right to speak as a representative of New Testament criticism. If so, my first assertion—and a very emphatic one—would be that President

Eliot's statement of its results is much nearer the truth than that of the Idealistic Monists. Criticism has given not less, but more of tangible, vivid reality to the portrait of Jesus. The historical figure of Jesus, the prophet of Nazareth, stands out with far greater clearness than before in everything that makes for concrete reality. As for the golden background of dogma, Pauline and later, against which the historical figure has been seen projected by those who transmit to us the portrait, that also is the affair of criticism. It represents the apostolic gospel *about* Jesus, the Petrine and Pauline interpretation of the significance of his person, his experience, his fate. Is the New Testament critic a judge of these things? Perhaps not, if we accept the definition of the representative of Nineteenth Century Liberalism. His idea would seem to be that the critic when he has arrived at the gospel *about* Christ has no use for it but to cast it as rubbish to the void. But we have ourselves defined the critic to be a "historian of ideas." When he

discriminates concrete fact and event from the contemporary interpretation which they received, it is the thought rather than the thing which concerns him. True, he must know the thing, else he cannot adequately appreciate the thought. Therefore he is in the first instance a historical critic. But in the present field it is not political science, or strategics, nor even the progress of art and literature which count. We are dealing with the history of *religion*. In this field, it is true, historical facts are not unimportant, because when properly sifted they fall to be classified and interpreted in accordance with modern experience by modern standards. But contemporary judgments of the significance of facts, inferences, convictions, faiths, doctrines, are *more* important; because what we aim to discover is the progress of man's inward experience, his religious instinct. If, then, Nineteenth Century Liberalism, as we find it represented in President Eliot's article, seems to regard it as the function of New Testament criticism merely to

eliminate and discard the gospel *about* Jesus, that we must pronounce to be a misconception. What the critic really does with this inward reflection of history (if I may so call it) we shall see later. It must be considered in our third Lecture entitled, "Twentieth Century Mythical Idealism," when we examine the Idealistic Monist's conception of the results of criticism and the kind of reconstruction of Christianity he would base upon them. Let us turn first to his judgment of fact.

Before taking up consideration of Nineteenth Century Liberalism, permit me to offer a preliminary caution. We have two kinds of respect to maintain: We are to maintain, first, respect for the ripe thought of one of the representative scholars of our age, a fearless, broad-minded leader of thought. If the school represented by President Eliot is small, let us remember what manner of men they are, and that judgments in the realm of truth do not go by count of heads. We are to maintain, second, respect for the tribunal we occupy. For

the time being, at least, we are judge and jury in the court of the History and Philosophy of Religion. To judge of criticism we must become critics—the best critics we can. If we reason at all about better or worse, truer or more erroneous, forms of religion, we are compelled to resort to this court; for no other common standard exists. We occupy today the seats of men committed to the belief that spiritual, as well as physical life, advances under a law of evolution. Christianity, if it really represents the central stem of growth in the branching tree of the religious instinct of humanity, must be expected to respond to the changed world-views of the twentieth century, as in former times it adjusted itself, without alteration of its distinctive character, to Aristotelian and Copernican conceptions. Is President Eliot's forecast adequate? We are to answer this question from the viewpoint of the historian of religion (the speaker aiming simply to give you access to it) and we are to remember that there is another claimant in the

field, of precisely the opposite way of thinking. Perhaps there is no justice in the claim of either to stand in the line of historic development. Perhaps there is something in the claim of one, or both. In any event there is an obligation of respect besides that we shall endeavor to show towards the claimants. It is respect for ourselves, and for the lofty tribunal we temporarily ascend.

I. It is characteristic of what I reluctantly consent to call the 'Liberal' Christianity of the Nineteenth Century (for I do not think it really deserves the name) to seek religious adjustment to the evolutionary world-view by historico-critical analysis of the primitive sources. So far, so good. But it also seems to regard the process of criticism as aiming at and accomplishing a kind of separation of the sheep from the goats, metal from dross, after this fashion: This, the historical, I keep; this, the legendary, mythological, imaginative, or doctrinal is worthless, and I throw it away. You will find this same attitude

of mind assumed by much less thoughtful people toward the work of biblical critics in certain current expressions which suggest that the higher critics 'cut out' this or that from the Bible, 'reject' this or that, retaining the remainder. The biblical critic is supposed to have but one standard of value—historicity.

Now it is true that the *first* inferences the critic draws from the classification of his material aim to determine an orderly chronological account of the course of external events. This is the only reasonable mode of procedure if he would trace the deeper, more elusive processes of spiritual development. It does not follow that the critic 'throws away' that portion of his material which reflects something other than visible, tangible matter of fact. Indeed, if he did he would be like a silver miner who after separating the lead from his mixed ore threw away the more valuable metal. From what was said a few moments ago you will perceive how slight foundation there is for the talk about critics 'cut-

ting out' parts of the Bible. Critics are not more disposed than other men to saw off the branch they sit on. Neither do they undertake a task that is apt to bring them anything rather than thanks because of their exceptional love for the concrete facts of Hebrew history. Apart from the development of *religion*, what care we for the struggle of Moses against Pharaoh, David against the Philistines, or even of Paul against the Judaizers? To many a critic the battles of rooks and daws would be as interesting. Critics engage in their laborious analyses, putting on one side historical events—call that the lead—putting on the other contemporary reactions of the religious mind upon the events in the form of doctrine, myth, philosophy—call that the silver—not for love of the base metal, but for the silver. Religious thought, like all other thought, depends upon experience. But the biblical critic does not stop with the attempt to define the experience. He advances from it to the interpretation devout men put upon it. His quest is that which the

scientific mind designates 'the evolution of religion' and the religious mind 'God's progressive self-manifestation in the human soul.' The fourth evangelist has a technical term for this spiritual core of history. He designates it "that which was from the beginning, the Word of life; for the life was manifested, ... even the eternal life which was with the Father and hath been manifested unto us."

It seems, however, to be the ideal of the 'liberal' to reconstruct Christianity by restoring what he understands to be "the religion of Jesus"; and he extols the work of the New Testament critic as having made this achievement practicable by eliminating what he calls the "pagan intrusions." The formula for this type of reconstruction would run somewhat as follows: From contents of New Testament subtract and discard the gospel *about* Jesus, an element of legend and myth derived from the dogmatic period inaugurated by the apotheosis of Jesus after his death. The remainder will be the gospel *of* Jesus, an admirably

simple summary of human duty. We shall have "morality lit up with emotion," which has been offered as a definition of religion. The morality will be the law of love. The emotion will be of two kinds: First, trust in a Heavenly Father, whose beneficent purpose for the world becomes ultimately apparent in a truly brotherly social order, the Kingdom of God; second, loyalty to the historic Jesus as a sublimely consistent and heroic leader of the world into its ideal and ultimate social order.

Christianity as thus reconstructed will not entirely lack the element of religion as distinguished from morality pure and simple. It will have in addition to the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount the 'paternal theism' of the Lord's Prayer. It would not be fair to refuse to it the title 'Christian.' For, however little its 'Hebrew purity' advances beyond the Judaism which writers such as Abrahams and Montefiore are teaching us to discover in the Talmud, however completely it discards all speculations on the person of Christ, and even doubts

of personal immortality, still it places the historic Jesus in a position of permanent supremacy. To him the supreme loyalty of every man will always be due; because the ideal of the Kingdom of God once adequately presented as Jesus has presented it admits no higher social ideal. And the very restriction of our knowledge of the historic Jesus to the simple fact that he lived and died in absolute faithfulness to this ideal excludes the possibility that any later claimant should usurp the place. The greater the simplicity, the poverty, the outward limitation of his lot in humble Galilee, the more perfect his adaptation to hold the fealty of all men in all ages including the simplest and lowliest.

Difficult as it is to distinguish religion of this type from 'reformed' Judaism, the critically reconstructed Christianity of 'liberalism' is not only theistic, but Christian; for it makes the supremacy of Jesus permanent and unique. It is also in a true sense historical; for in spite of the extravagant assertions of

the Monists regarding the destructive effects of New Testament criticism (they also begin by praising the judge: "O righteous judge! O able judge!"), it *is* a practicable thing to reproduce in outline both the religious teaching, and the moral portrait of the historical Jesus. That is a plain, scientific fact, resting on exactly the same kind of evidence we would apply in the case of Socrates, or Mohammed, or Julius Cæsar.

II. There is, indeed, an obstacle to such historical delineation—the factor of miracle which is prominent in the record, and as some think is fatal to historical portraiture. Our contention is that this factor is really subordinate and incidental.

The historical outline of Jesus' teaching, character, and career down to the crucifixion is as little affected by the few anecdotes of miracle connected with the reports, as that of other ancient characters by the similar anecdotes related of them. In spite of the agitation over the question of Jesus' miracles the matter

is not really vital. It is as indifferent to the truly critical historian of religion as Dr. George A. Gordon, in his Taylor Lectures given at Yale in 1909 on *Religion and Miracle,* has shown that it may be for the theologian. The New Testament critic finds the Apostle Paul referring in indubitably authentic letters to miraculous healings wrought (to use the New Testament phrase) "by the power of the Spirit" through himself and others. His references show that healings of the type attributed to Jesus in the Gospels were then not unusual occurrences in the Church. Besides Paul's references we have fragments of the contemporary diary of one of his travelling companions, fragments whose testimony not the most exacting of scientific critics will wholly set aside. These fragments record not only healings, but exorcisms, visions, supernatural deliverances, and even a supposed resuscitation from death. In all of these both Paul and the diarist were personally participant. Of course it is to be admitted that if *we moderns* had been present we might

have put a different interpretation on the phenomena. *We* should not have recorded the exorcism of the pythoness at Philippi as the going out of an evil spirit, nor the restoration to consciousness of Eutychus at Troas as a return from the dead. Miracles are made not by the facts, but by the interpretation put upon the facts. And each age makes its own interpretation. The same phenomena are to one man, of one age, miracles; to another man of a later age, 'providential' occurrences, or perhaps only operations of 'natural law' imperfectly understood. It is not the business of the historical critic to decide philosophically which point of view is more correct, but to read records of the past with eyes trained to the light of the writer's period. From this sympathetic viewpoint the few anecdotes of miracle in the gospel record of Jesus' career and teaching present scarcely more of difficulty than those of the letters of Paul, accompanied as these are by fragments of a companion's diary embedded in the later chapters of Acts. We must allow,

of course, that gospel narrative is not magically free from human exaggeration and growth of legend. That follows from mere comparison of the later with the earlier. Again some parts of the story have better support than others. The healings and exorcisms to which Jesus' own sayings make incidental reference are not to be classed with tales of prodigy in nature, to which his own sayings give no support, if indeed they are not disclaimed.

Above all else we must exclude the accounts of the resurrection from the story of Jesus' earthly career. The resurrection does not belong among the mighty works attributed to him. The New Testament writers justly regard the 'raising up' of Jesus as a work of God *upon* him. To Paul, as to his predecessors, the revelation 'in' them of their glorified Lord was a wonderful work of God upon themselves. He had "opened the eyes of their hearts" to perceive the spiritual fact. The resurrection, then, so far as we can reach it at all, is an experience of Jesus' *follow-*

ers after his death. In the records of it which survive they have expressed variously their sense of a vital relation established between his living, glorified personality and theirs. Critical study of the records brings us thus ultimately to a phenomenon in the field of the psychology of religion. Nothing, indeed, in all the history of Christianity is of more vital importance than this experience. It deserves the study of psychologists such as the late William James. But I am speaking now of Jesus' own earthly life and work, including the stories of healings and other wonders, and I merely state the almost self-evident principle that to the historical critic accustomed to allow for distortion and exaggeration in the report, they are no more mysterious or unaccountable than the similar contemporary anecdotes about Paul. And Paul's 'miracles' and 'signs of an apostle' are sufficiently attested. They are, in fact, alluded to by himself in letters whose authenticity is beyond dispute. In short, the problem of 'miracle' is not a problem for

the physicist, nor for the philosopher. We cannot repeat the experiment. What we have before us is the testimony. Primarily, then, it is a problem for the literary critic. His work must come first. He must find out what sort of occurrences were designated 'miracles' in that age, and gave rise to the reports.

It is, then, a perfectly practicable thing for New Testament criticism to present in outline a scientifically trustworthy account of the teaching of Jesus, and also of his character and public career; an account wherein the moot-point of miracle will be purely incidental and subordinate. For this purpose we have two ultimate sources, attested by ancient tradition, and reproduced with greater or less success by the approved processes of modern analytical criticism applied to the group of three interrelated writings called the Synoptic Gospels.[1] Many New Testament scholars

[1] On the task of New Testament criticism in the characterization of the historical Jesus see the Essay appended to this series of Lectures. An accurate account of critical results in the analysis and valuation of gospel sources will be found in James Mof-

hold that the two ultimate sources on which our earlier three Gospels were primarily based were, first, a compilation of the Precepts of Jesus, giving the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount and the worship of the Lord's Prayer; second, anecdotes orally reported by Peter, illustrative both of Jesus' teachings and of his character and public career. Early and undisputed tradition, partly confirmed by the results of modern criticism, tells us that the book of Precepts was compiled by the Apostle Matthew about the period of the great Pauline Epistles (50-60 A. D.), and was in "Hebrew" (probably meaning Aramaic). This implies that its circulation was at first confined to Syria. Many critical attempts have been made to reproduce it, and are accessible in Hebrew, Greek, German and English;[2] but the results, while mutually confirmatory, do not agree with the ancient tradition. A "second source" (designated Q) inde-

fatt's *Introduction to New Testament Literature;* Chas. Scribner's Sons, New York, 1911.

[2] Sixteen are reproduced in outline in Moffatt's *Introduction,* pp. 194-206.

pendent of Mark, and probably older, can be recovered from Matthew and Luke by subtracting the coincident material which they do not derive from Mark. But Q was not a "Hebrew" document. It was not confined to "precepts," and it has closer affinity with Luke than with "Matthew." The teaching of Jesus is indeed far more prominent in it than the "mighty works," and it may represent a stage between the reported apostolic book of Precepts (Logia) and the narrative of Mark, but the work of analysis is not yet complete.

The other reported source, Peter's oral reminiscences, lies at the foundation of our present oldest Gospel, a compilation credibly attributed to Paul's follower, John Mark. This Gospel was written in Rome after the death of both Paul and Peter (*ca.* 75 A. D.). The striking peculiarity of this Gospel of Mark is that it includes neither the Sermon on the Mount nor the Lord's Prayer, but culminates in the story of Calvary. Manifestly the work was not framed for the purpose of giving the

teaching *of* Jesus, but of proving the apostolic gospel *about* Jesus. Its message was that he was the Son of God, who redeemed mankind through the Cross and Resurrection. The anecdotes related by Mark are therefore largely of the sort to prove Jesus' supernatural endowment with "the Spirit"—that effluence from God to which we find the early Church attributing all its gifts of 'miracles' or 'prophecy,' as well as its moral power and its assurance of eternal life. The argument is that Jesus from his baptism by John had been endowed with this 'Spirit of Adoption' in its fulness. He thereafter exhibited in his ministry in unlimited degree the qualities of 'the Spirit,' "the word of wisdom and the word of power." But above and beyond this in his martyrdom he showed by word and example as Leader of human redemption what it is to be a son of God and an heir of eternal life. This, you see at once, is a totally different kind of gospel from any mere compilation of precepts. It aims to make converts rather than to

build up disciples. Its reminiscences of Peter are used chiefly in the interest of the gospel *about* Jesus, the Pauline gospel of human redemption through the cross and resurrection, a gospel which we have not yet taken into consideration at all, and must defer until the third and closing lecture. Obviously this oldest of our canonical Gospels would serve but ill the purposes of our 'liberal' reconstructionist. But remove from this Gospel of Mark its Pauline (or quasi-Pauline) redemption doctrine, the evangelist's effort to present the Spirit-filled Jesus as the world-redeeming Son of God. You will have left, if your work be accurately done, an outline portrait of the real Jesus in his distinctive character, life and work. And there will be not a few homely touches to corroborate the ancient tradition which declares it to rest upon the preaching of Peter.

III. President Eliot and the 'liberals' are right in saying that the nineteenth century, the century of historical criticism, has accomplished a great work

for the development of our religion by these attempts to reach back through the traditional testimony of Matthew and Peter toward a trustworthy portrait of the historical Jesus. The lines are as yet perhaps but faint and wavering, but they will grow firmer and clearer. It is not the bodily but the spiritual portrait of Jesus that vitally concerns us; and that is already drawn, and can never be obliterated. We already know the spirit of Jesus' teaching and life better than the spirit and life of many a great man of modern history; and we can see that his religion was truly the consummate flower of all that the nationalistic, ethical, or social type can offer. It is the religion of Moses and the prophets without its racial limitations. The Matthæan tradition of Jesus' teaching gives us, as I have said, the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount and the paternal theism of the Lord's Prayer. The Petrine tradition of his career, Mark's anecdotes of his life and character, give us a Leader to command the altruistic loyalty of the

human race, until the goal is reached in the ideal social order of the Kingdom of God. As the Fourth Gospel expresses it: "He came unto his own (domain) and his own (people) received him not. But to as many as received him—lost sons, outcasts, sinners—he gave the right to be called 'sons of God.'" This ethical and this social ideal are ultimate. No one will ever improve upon the aspiration: "Be ye therefore perfect even as your Father; for He is kind even to the unthankful and evil. Be imitators of Him and ye shall be sons and daughters of the Highest." There is not, and there never can be, a higher conception than this of duty and (racial) destiny. Neither can there ever be a Leader besides this man to whom all humanity can look up as Lord and Christ, without fear of disappointment or humiliation. The greatest hero, martyr, prophet, were he a very son of God in his devotion to the will of the Father in heaven, could only be a *second* Christ, a younger brother of the Lord. The ideal is ultimate, and its representa-

tive is unique. Full historical research has established their position forever.

Moreover, there is something peculiarly appealing to our age in this conception of Christianity. We, today, are in full reaction from the mystical type of religion. We are no longer concerned, as our fathers were, with the redemption of the individual soul, its sin and weakness, its responsibility to God and dependence on Him, its redemption from sin and death, its participation now and hereafter in the eternal life of God. We are swinging back toward the social, ethical type. The modern man is more intent on getting this world saved than in getting saved out of it for a hypothetical world to come. We modern democrats have no benevolent despotism like the Cæsars to which we can entrust the destinies of the commonwealth in reasonable confidence that peace, order, justice, civilization, will advance progressively toward a not distant millennium. We are bitterly conscious of the failures of our own attempts. How little has been realized of

that democracy, civilization, federation of the world, from which so much was hoped when Tennyson wrote his Locksley Hall! We are hotly aware of the injustice of the economic and social system. We thought we were creating a brotherhood of man, and our republic turns out to be a mere plutocracy. Industrial capitalism confers one-tenth of the common product on the toilers and nine-tenths on the idlers. In days like these men want an altruistic religion, a religion of ethics and a righteous social order, the moral religion of the prophets and of Jesus, with its law of 'greatness through service' and its ideal of a brotherhood of the race under the fatherhood of God.

Why not, then, for the Religion of the Future, go back to the gospel of Jesus, discarding the "pagan intrusions" of the age of Paul?

No adequate answer to that question can be tainted with personal prejudice, theological bias, or individual sentiment. To be effective it must be made in the spirit of the historian of religion, who

judges of the future by the past. The historian anticipates new adaptations from a vital and growing faith; but he forecasts their nature by knowledge of the faith itself in its original formation, and by comparison with previous eras of change. From this point of view there can be but one answer: Historically Christianity is a religion *about* Jesus, originating with a psychological experience of his disciples which we term the Resurrection, and propagated under Hellenistic influences.

To say that there is nothing new in the proposals of Nineteenth Century Liberalism is to concede exactly what its advocates maintain. In their enthusiasm for getting back to the facts of history they have not only gone back to the beginning of our religion. They have gone clear past the beginning and come out on the other side in pure Judaism. The Christian religion did not begin with the earthly life of Jesus. That is an idea which arose after the period of the Apostles in the age of the Evangelists such as Mark. Our religion began

with the "manifestation of the Son of God," which was not a physical but a psychical experience. It began with the Cross and Resurrection, the doctrine *about* Jesus. Of course this experience was *conditioned* on what had gone before. The known example and teaching of the Galilean prophet gave content to the all-important proper name in the confession "*Jesus* is Lord." That example and teaching in themselves represented simply Judaism brought to its perfect consummation and flower, the religion of the prophets freely interpreted by One in whom their very spirit was incarnate. Paul and others who brought this gospel of the Resurrection of Jesus to the Gentile world applied the Hellenistic conceptions of Incarnation and Redemption to the story of Calvary.

What right, then, have we to call it an "intrusion" when Paul interprets that tragedy, together with his own subsequent experience and that of others in whom (to use his own expression) "God energized" through the Spirit of

Jesus to give the knowledge and power of sonship and eternal life, by the use of Hellenistic conceptions? Had all the Greek-speaking Gentile world converted by Paul and his fellow-preachers of the 'gospel of reconciliation' no rights of citizenship in the kingdom of heaven, because forsooth Jesus was a Jew and spoke Aramaic? Paul himself admits that for the confirmation of the promises made to the fathers, Jesus was made "a minister of the circumcision." But he does not admit that "God is the God of the Jews only and not of the Gentiles also." The experience of redemption, sonship, participation in the eternal life of God through the spirit of Jesus have been no small factor in historic Christianity. These have found expression in myriads of lives that knew little enough of his earthly career. Are we the spiritual children of our Jewish mother only, and not also of our Gentile father? If so, we must logically repudiate Paul, and humbly return to the Galilean apostles who knew him after the flesh. We must seek a late admission

to the little group of reformed Jews in Palestine who made James, the Lord's brother, a kind of Caliph in Jerusalem, and for a century or so continued to regard themselves as the only heirs apparent of the coming kingdom.

Such a narrow type of Jewish Christianity actually did exist from the beginning. It repudiated Paul and all his works. It looked upon Jesus as the "Prophet like unto Moses," whose teachings, if obeyed, would induce God's sending him into the world again as the Messiah, to restore the kingdom to Israel. It confined its horizon to the twelve tribes of Israel, with a penumbra of Gentile converts "clinging to the skirts of him that is a Jew," and it continued in existence as late as 150 A. D. At this date Justin and other Greek fathers describe the sect, etymologizing their name, 'Ebionite,' to mean 'poor' in respect to Christology. Like the rest of orthodox Jews, the Ebionites could see God in nature and God in history; they recognized that Jesus was an incomparable teacher in this aspect

of religion. But there they stopped short. To see God in personality, as the Greek sees him, was to them abomination and blasphemy. Paul's conception of the message to the world as a doctrine *about* Jesus, a gospel of "God reconciling the world *in* Christ" preached by "ministers of the new covenant" who had seen, like Moses, "the light of the knowledge of the glory of God," but "in the face of Jesus Christ"—that was beyond them. They could not see that the *personality* of Jesus in his life, death, and resurrection is a phenomenon which has significance for our *personality*. That was an idea which only the Greek mind was ready for. Since Plato it had come to concern itself with the relation, now and hereafter, of the conscious self to its preëxisting, infinite Source, the conscious, purposing God. To the whole Greek-speaking world of Paul's day, including Greek-speaking Jews like himself, this had become the main thing in religion. To the Ebionite it was nothing. The Ebionite remained a practical, moral, 'reformed' Jew.

For the Greek Christian, on the contrary, the real story of Jesus was not the story of the Nazarene prophet like unto Moses; nor was the Greek Christian's expectation of the coming Christ the hope for a second and greater David. His version of the redemption story was a drama of the unseen. It began with Incarnation—entrance of an element of the divine nature into the world in the person of Jesus. It touched the depth of pathos in Atonement—the suffering of this divine Being in and for our humanity. It culminated in his victory over our foes of sin and death. The Greek Christian's expectation of Christ was that of a Forerunner of our Immortality,[3] welcoming his brethren into the life hid with him in the bosom of his Father. Can we wonder that to the Greek Christian the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount and the 'paternal theism' of the Lord's Prayer taken alone represented an 'impoverished' form of the gospel? How could we expect Justin Martyr midway in the second century

[3] Cf. Acts 4: 15, Heb. 2: 10, 12: 2 (Greek).

to do otherwise than hold that the Jewish Christian who had failed to take in the significance of this drama had never risen to the true meaning of the gospel, never got beyond a reformed and universalized Judaism! In point of fact, as Jewish Christianity dwindled and Greek Christianity increased, the Greek Christian at last lost patience and maintained that the Jewish Christian, if he persisted in his intolerance of the ampler Gentile gospel, should be excluded from the Church altogether.

IV. The rivalry between that ethical type of Christianity to which Nineteenth Century Liberalism looks back and the mystical did not cease with the second century. In that age the conception which views it as a doctrine *about* Jesus, the revelation of God to man and of man to himself, embodied in the story of Calvary had the upper hand. Individual personality and its destiny was the great interest of the day, and so far as the history of religion enables us to judge, this interest can never cease to be

felt. For men are concerned with more than *racial* destiny. The individual is not made for the social order, but the social order for the individual. Hence while the Empire lasted personal redemption and immortality played a larger part in men's religious interest than questions of social duty and the evolution of a Kingdom of God. Gentile Christianity, with its Greek ideas, its inheritance from the mystical religions of individual redemption, its interest in personality in man and God, had free course and was glorified. The theology it built up for the Church was based on Paul, elaborated by Greek thinkers, consolidated by Augustine. It became our theology, our Christianity in systematic form. But Semitic 'liberalism' when ejected as heretical from the fellowship of Nicæa did not cease to be. It experienced a marvellous renaissance on its own ancestral ground, that grew and flourished as the Empire fell into decay.

We are apt to forget that there was a Unitarian movement against the

Christianity of the Greek theologians many centuries before the days of Channing. This type of Unitarian belief numbers its adherents today by the hundred million against the few hundred thousands of our own nineteenth century Bostonian variety, and is still spreading at a surprising rate. I mean the great movement of reaction against the Greek type of Christianity which started in the seventh century from the Syrian coast and Arabia with the cry: "There is no God but God (the God of Abraham) and Mohammed is his prophet." If we put "Jesus" in place of "Mohammed"—and every good Moslem will admit that *until* Mohammed this would be right—you have the same kind of religion in Islam that you would have if you carried back Christianity to the period before Paul. Ebionism had a creed exactly equivalent: "God is the God of Abraham, Moses, and David; and Jesus is his Prophet." And Mohammedan unitarianism is a present-day force by no means to be despised. It is less scientific than Nineteenth Cen-

tury Liberalism; but those who know it at first hand know that it more than makes up in sincerity of conviction, in ardor of missionary zeal, and in success of missionary effort, for its medieval world-view.

Do not think I am depreciating the historico-critical Nineteenth Century Liberalism by this comparison. Far from it. One must see Islam as it is to see what a social, ethical religion can do for barbarous conditions of life. I make the comparison for the sake of perspective and alignment. The two attempts to reconstruct Christianity, Islam and Nineteenth Century Liberalism, are of the same order, though separated by thirteen centuries. Their common viewpoint is that the Greek element in Christianity, the doctrine that the person and fate of Jesus, in his work, his martyrdom, his resurrection, rightly interpreted, contain (in Hegel's phrase) a "representation of the divine idea," is all "pagan intrusion"; and that the results of biblical criticism invite us to discard it. So conceived, the work of

the historical critic—if he himself may be permitted to judge—is indeed a magnificent failure. He has kept the base metal and thrown away the silver. Dr. Anderson will be justified in speaking of the "Collapse of Liberal Christianity," if its only result is to reason itself back into Judaism, annul the marriage of Semitic with Aryan faith, and disown the parent from which it drew the vital energy of its earliest and greatest days. Religion may choose for its asylum between Synagogue and Mosque. The Church henceforth will be but an empty shrine.

But no; Nineteenth Century Liberalism is far from having said the last word on the Religion of the Future. Nevertheless, it is well to remember the great words it *has* said. The biblical criticism to which it appeals has indeed made reconstruction unavoidable. And it has supplied some of the most indispensable elements for the structure. It has restored to us from the Synoptic Gospels the priceless legacy of the Historical Jesus, resting on the witness of Mat-

thew and Peter. It has put the records of historical fact into critical, scientific form, just at the exigency when they were needed. On the other hand it has *not* given us the Religion, the Christianity, of the Future. It has not even, as yet, given us the real Christianity of the past, the Christianity that won the Gentile world in the days of Peter and Paul. For that we must look to further and wider results of the critic's work, his study of the doctrine *about* Jesus, the interpretation given by primitive believers to the work of God effected by the Spirit of Jesus. His death, his resurrection, inwardly experienced by these men as "the power of God unto salvation"—these are the most important data in all the psychology of religion, to speak only from the scientist's point of view.

The resurrection experience was necessarily described by those who had it under the forms of thought and speech available to their time. Critics, if their work is to have value, must distinguish between pre-critical and critical history,

pre-scientific and scientific reflection upon experience. Pre-critical report we call 'tradition' or 'legend.' Pre-scientific theology we call 'myth.' Those who fail to understand the object of criticism regard these terms 'legend' and 'myth' as opprobrious. When a great scholar of our time, describing the Redemption doctrine of the Pauline missionary preaching, declares:

> This whole point of view is a myth from beginning to end, and cannot be termed anything else. . . . . It is the story of a God who had descended from heaven.[4]

the common assumption is that the critic means to reject this apostolic interpretation of the career of Jesus as worthless, whereas it really implies only that Paul's interpretation is precisely what it was required to be to fit the capacity of a pre-philosophic age.

But call this apostolic interpretation what you will, 'myth' or 'theology' or 'philosophy,' the experience for which it stands is the inward work of God

[4] Wernle, *Beginnings of our Religion*, I, p. 251.

effected through the Spirit of Jesus, and that experience, then and now, represents the acme in the psychology of religion. If the Apostle's expression of his experience is unsuitable to our time let it be recast—let us make a better. The very last thing the true critic and historian of religion will do with 'mythical' interpretations of genuine experience is to throw them away. In the concluding Lecture, on Idealistic Monism and its proposals for the reconstruction of Christianity, I shall have occasion to speak of the results of criticism in the mythology of the faith; for, as you know, the Idealistic Monist finds the beginnings of our religion quite rightly in the gospel *about* Jesus, and even considers its mythology to be its sole element of value. But Idealistic Monism also makes its appeal to the results of criticism, and may be judged by the history of a corresponding tendency in the early Church.

III

TWENTIETH CENTURY MYTHICAL IDEALISM

I. Let me remind you of the statement made in the previous lectures that Nineteenth Century Liberalism is not the only claimant to represent the religion of the future. The reconstruction of Christianity proposed by the Idealistic Monists, Kalthoff and Drews in Germany, J. M. Robertson and K. C. Anderson in England, and W. B. Smith in this country, is also a candidate. And Idealistic Monism is the opposite of Nineteenth Century Liberalism. It proposes to discard the history and retain the mythology. It favors Greek thought as against Semitic. It looks upon Paul as the real founder of Christianity, and in the extreme form, represented by Drews, Robertson, and Smith, it even denies that there ever was a historic Jesus. Where Paul in his letters refers to events in the career of Jesus critical

surgeons of this school operate at once. The passage must be removed as a foreign body. Others of saner judgment, such as Mauernbrecher, admit that the historical portrait drawn by the critics is in the main trustworthy, but they demand to know how one is to worship a saint without a halo. Schnehen, for example, pours out the vials of his scorn upon the 'liberals' whom he designates "Jesus-worshippers." The uncritical traditionalist, says Schnehen, is in a way consistent. He has always been taught to think of Jesus as a superhuman Being temporarily resident on the earth. Such worship is justifiable. The 'liberal,' says Schnehen, is inconsistent. He has taken away the halo of mythology and substituted a modern portrait. But he still continues to bow down in worship as before—or at least pretends to. Fie on such hypocrisy, is his cry. Speak the truth out squarely, and confess that Jesus either never lived at all, or that his earthly career was not substantially different from other men's and has no bearing on the case. Religion does not

concern itself with questions of history. Religion concerns itself with the experience of the soul, and the artless language of this experience is myth. Comparative mythology, therefore, is the proper basis for the religion of the future.

The Monist's proposal has had a startling effect, where, as in Germany, it has been brought squarely before the people in great public conventions. Walls and fences have been placarded with "Jesus did live," and "Jesus lives." In Berlin vast crowds stood for hours on the steps of the great Court Church singing chorals and the Emperor himself took part in the controversy. Meantime the Monists were making a sensational propaganda through the principal cities of the Empire, and since that the propaganda has been systematically organized abroad. Drew's "Christ-myth," already in its tenth or eleventh edition in Germany, has been recently translated and published in this country by the Open Court Publishing Company of Chicago, organ of the Mon-

ists, and the theological journals are now exchanging shots over the new battle-ground.

As I said in the first lecture of this series, the Monist propaganda, active as it is, does not strike the historian of religion as important in itself, but simply as a symptom. It indicates that we are being swept by the first waves of a reaction from the ethical toward the mystical pole of Christian thought. We are beginning to feel again the insatiable human needs which gave birth to our religion in the first place, and to realize that Christianity did not begin as a system of ethics taught and lived by Jesus as conditioning the Kingdom of God. It began as a doctrine *about* Christ which aimed to express the inward experience of Peter and Paul. The Christology of Peter was antecedent to that of Paul. It expresses itself in the utterance: "God hath made that same Jesus whom ye crucified both Lord and Christ." It is an apotheosis doctrine. That of Paul is expressed under the form of a descent and ascent, in Hindu phraseology an

avatar doctrine: The spirit which was in Jesus came into the world from God. It so fully pervaded and controlled his nature as to give him complete victory over sin and death, the foes of humanity. The proof of this appears in the fact that after his death the same Spirit was received by other men in his name, Paul himself being of the number, transforming their personality. This is essentially an Incarnation doctrine. Paul has many expressions to describe his psychological experience which I need not repeat, "new birth," "new creation," "laying hold on life," "living in the Spirit," and the like. For him the main point was the moral transformation by which he found it now possible—yes, easy—to overcome the "law of sin in his members" which had "warred against the law of his mind, bringing him into captivity to sin and death." Others, less keenly susceptible on this moral side, were more impressed by the spectacular phenomena accompanying early Christian assemblies, the *charismata* or "gifts of the Spirit."

What we have to note is that the Spirit of Jesus, after his crucifixion, effected certain psychological phenomena in a group of men which they give account of in the doctrine that God has made him "Lord," "Christ," "Redeemer," "Son of God" for humanity. Our religion began with the testimony to this experience thus interpreted. It was a "witness of the resurrection." In Peter it took a form conditioned by his acquaintance with Jesus "after the flesh." In Paul its form was conditioned by the fact that his knowledge of Jesus was "after the Spirit" only. You cannot deny the psychological experience; for it still continues. You can indeed say: The interpretation hitherto put upon it is fanciful and unphilosophic. Doubtless Peter's interpretation, and Paul's too, was pre-scientific. But that only calls upon you to give a better and more philosophic one. That is what the Monist means when he says: Mythology is the true foundation for religion.

We may heartily and sincerely commend this view in two respects.

(1) It is true to history in reminding us that Christianity began as a teaching *about* Jesus, not as the teaching *of* Jesus. This is something which Nineteenth Century Liberalism did seem in danger of forgetting.

(2) The Monist's view is also true to philosophy in making the chief concern of religion the welfare of the individual soul. Having once attained to the consciousness of an individual personality, the human being must concern himself with the welfare of this new-found treasure. Even his concern for the welfare of others must now transcend conditions of bodily comfort. Their 'personality' must have room to develop as well as his. Religion *must* henceforth have for him as its primary object the bringing of his own 'personality' into right relations—relations not of the present only, but of the eternal world. Until he has secured this highest good for himself—'salvation' is the 'mythological' term for it—he cannot expect to secure it for others. But what is 'salvation' when we cease to think in terms of

mythology and begin to think in terms of scientific psychology?

Christianity, as I have said, was in its early days only one of a number of religions of personal redemption, most or all of them oriental, which were offering 'salvation,' and competing for the adherence of the mixed masses of the cosmopolitan Empire. The old national religions had crumbled with the nationalities concerned. Judaism had been transcendentalized, the religion of Rome had been made cosmopolitan in the form of emperor-worship. The new sense of the value of individual personality, largely a product of Greek thinking, was expressing itself in a revival of the myths and ritual forms of ancient nature-worship. The old chthonic religions which had personified the power of astral motion, or of vegetal and animal fructification and reproduction, were recast in forms to give expression to the soul's aspiration after this indestructible life and power. Christianity triumphed because it met this need and met it better than its rivals. Forty

years ago, yes, even twenty, we knew almost nothing about this prodigious movement of the human mind between the time when Alexander married Asia to Europe and that when the Antonine emperors set up the national religion of Rome as a new and universal state religion. Our generation has seen the rise of the school of comparative mythology (*die religionsgeschichtliche Schule*). Bousset and Gunkel have showed how Persian and Greek ideas were responsible for the later developments of Judaism. R. H. Charles has given us editions of the apocalyptic literature, with its hierarchies of angels and demons and its dualistic world-view. We have obtained an insight into the nature of Pharisaism with its book-religion, its doctrines of angels and spirits, of individual resurrection and participation in the world to come. Rohde's *Psyche,* Reitzenstein's *Poimander* and Krebs' *Der Logos als Heiland* have opened the mines of Hermetic speculation of Egypt and shown from another angle how the Hellenistic mind was

absorbed with the idea of personal immortality by participation in divine life. Dieterich's *Mithras Liturgie* and Cumont's enlightening studies have thrown light on the process by which Roman paganism was submerged under the flood of mystery-cults from the East. The mystery-cult of Mithra, carried by Roman armies from Persia to Britain, was only the last and most formidable of these rivals of Christianity. Percy Gardner and Gilbert Murray have lifted a corner of the curtain from the Greek mysteries. Frazer's *Adonis, Attis, Osiris* has revealed the persistence into medieval times of these prehistoric forms of nature-worship. All have proved that the treatment of the story of Jesus, as Paul and the Greek-Christian world treated it, was simply inevitable. The theme of the *Dying and Rising World Redeemer,* which one of the recent booklets of the comparative Religionists takes as its title, was the stock in trade of the oriental religions. There were scores of them. The ancient nature-myths of Orpheus descending to

the other world to bring back dead Eurydice, Osiris, Attis, Adonis, returning from the realms of death, sun-heroes like Marduk, Mithra, Herakles, renewing their strength in conflict with the powers of death and darkness—all these were brought out and refurbished, because in the piping times of peace, and in the world-culture of the Empire, men had come to realize that they had individual souls, and had begun to think quite as much about what was going to become of these as about what was going to become of tribe or nation. The Empire should take care of itself.

It is because the tragedy of Calvary was enacted in a generation that had risen to this level of consciousness that it gave rise to a new religion, and not to a mere reformation of Judaism. What Philo sought to do and could not, because he spoke only from the academic halls of Alexandria, Paul the "apostle to the Gentiles" accomplished. We in our generation have just begun to realize the real psychological situation in the first century A. D., which made the new

world-religion possible. And of course we begin to have at once a school of transcendentalists who say: "What is the use of the historical element in Christianity anyway?" "Why not take simply the mythology that the first century insisted on applying to the case of Jesus, and reduce it to modern scientific terms?"

These are the first fruits of the so-called *Religionsgeschichtliche Schule,* the school of New Testament criticism which treats its *religious ideas* as the silver, and seeks to understand these ideas in relation to current phases of the age-long, instinctive aspiration of humanity toward some sort of participation in the cosmic life.

What now is true in this contention? It is true that Christianity never would have become a world-religion at all but for the inward experience of Saul of Tarsus, a typical Hellenistic experience of individual soul-redemption. We may say truly that Saul of Tarsus never would have had this experience if he had not been born and bred on Gentile soil.

Jew as he was, it was not the conservative type of Judaism which he followed —the Sadducean—nor the political—Zealotry. It was Pharisaism, the progressive type, the transcendental. Saul of Tarsus had followed it, we are told, under Gamaliel, a rabbi famous for his study of Greek literature. Saul's soul-devouring pursuit had been an ideal of personal redemption, an ideal which, however firmly rooted in Judaism, especially in Pharisean Judaism, in the time of Paul, is not of Hebrew origin. It is born of the antithesis between flesh and spirit. It springs from the discovery of the personal ego, 'the inward man,' projected against the background of a material world, alien, if not hostile, to the spirit. This self-discovery of the soul was not a discovery of the Hebrew prophets. It is the response of Greek thought to the Delphic motto: "Know thyself." And Pharisaism as a religion of personal redemption developed in two directions. One was the legalism of the synagogue from which Paul revolted. The other was a religion of the Spirit.

II. Knowledge of these contemporary conditions of religious thought leads to the following general proposition: Personal religion in our sense of the term may be regarded broadly as a product of Græco-Roman cosmopolitanism. But it did not, and could not, fully develop on the ordinary basis of allegorized mythology. Christianity prevailed because of its more solid basis of historic fact.

We may well approve the Monist's championship of mythology. It represents the mystical, individual factor in religion, that is, pre-scientific theology. But the Monist's reading of history is wrong. In the providence of God the mystical religion of personal redemption came to effective expression only through the acquisition of a social body. It became incarnate when it laid hold of the Christ-idea. An adequate, ultimate personal Redeemer for individual souls was found only in the World-saviour, the Prophet of Nazareth, the Christ of the new kingdom, who had now been made 'Lord.'

Paul's conversion, it is true, was conditioned by the hunger of his own soul for 'redemption' in more than the ancient Hebrew sense, in something of the Greek sense, i.e., emancipation of the soul by affiliation with God. But Paul would never have found the satisfaction of his own soul-hunger in the doctrine that 'Jesus is the Christ' if others before him, victims, like Stephen, of his persecuting zeal, and still others before Stephen, back to Peter, whose conversion Paul explicitly makes parallel in all essential points with his own, had not had an equivalent experience of the risen, glorified Jesus as a personal Redeemer. The beginning of our religion was the doctrine of 'the Spirit' as an effluence from the risen Jesus.

There is a profound justice not only in the representation of the New Testament that Christianity began as a witness of the resurrection, but also in its manifold witness that this redemptive experience, from which our religion starts, must be traced in the first instance to Peter. At first sight there may

seem to be no vital significance in the mere names 'Paul,' 'Peter.' If we are studying as a basis for the religion of the future the psychological experience which has found classical expression in the Christian doctrine of redemption, what difference can it make who led the way? If anything one would say, Let Paul be the founder. The experience of Paul is relatively clear; for his whole gospel is based on it. That of Peter is most obscure; for the secondary narratives which come down to us have unfortunately eclipsed the record of this vital, fundamental event, how Peter was "converted" after the crucifixion, and "stablished his brethren." All that remains is a few traces of how Peter became the Rock-foundation of the new brotherhood, the Pillar of the new temple; how, as Luke says, "the Lord appeared to Simon," or how, as Paul says, "God energized in Peter unto an apostleship of the circumcision." About all we know of Peter's experience is the bare fact that the risen Christ was "manifested to him." This primitive

form of the gospel of the resurrection has been superseded by traditions which concern themselves only with later disputes about what became of Jesus' body, traditions which play no part whatever in Paul's report of the common apostolic testimony to the fundamental inward experience, and need play no part in our own religious faith. It surely is disappointing to know so little about the most basic fact in the whole history of our religion. But 'learn from the enemy'! The vain endeavors of the opponents of historical Christianity to rid themselves of these references of Paul to Peter's experience, the anticipation of his own, testify to their value. Much as the Monists dislike to have it so, *Peter* and not Paul was the founder of the resurrection faith.

The one thing we do know for certain about the psychological origin of our religion is that it did *not* begin in the speculative mind of a late Jewish theologian, filled with the strange and mingled ideas of Hellenistic Judaism, unchecked by any personal recollection

of Jesus as he was. It began in the mind of one who had known Jesus intimately, a plain and simple Galilean, whose heart had been riven by an agony of remorse, despair, and bitter self-humiliation that made his experience in those days of Calvary a full equivalent for Paul's, but one whom we know otherwise only as a plain man of the people. Paul in his letters again and again describes his religious experience as a participation in the passion of Jesus, a dying and rising again with Christ. Peter's is not only referred to by him as similar; we can see for ourselves that it must needs have been so.

Meagre indeed is our knowledge of the inward experience of those pre-Pauline disciples, but they have left us one record, one testimony of their faith, as full of meaning as the Pauline Epistles themselves, if only we knew how to interpret it. I mean the rite of baptism, adopted in the days immediately after the crucifixion, as a distinctive rite of individual initiation into a separate community of believers in Jesus as

'Lord' and 'Christ.' The primitive disciples, we are told, were "baptized every one of them into the name of Jesus"; and this baptism was "*for the forgiveness of their sins.*" Why was this? What leads this group of men who had companied with Jesus since the baptism of John, now that they have become convinced that God has raised him from the dead and made him both Lord and Christ, to hark back beyond all their intercourse with him, beyond his preaching of the gospel of the kingdom, beyond their own vague, or fantastic, or materialistic messianic expectations, once ruined, now again reviving, back to the experience which some at least had had of the baptism of John? Why do they now adopt John's rite of a "baptism of repentance unto remission of sins" as the token of their new-found faith in Jesus?—To say that they had had an oracle of the risen Lord bidding them do so is only putting the same thing in different language. It means simply that in doing so they felt that

they were obeying the Spirit of Jesus; but why?

There is only one thing that the adoption of this Johannine rite of lustration in preparation for the kingdom of God can mean at this time. It means that as in Peter, so in the rest there was a profound sense of unreadiness without some moral renewal for the kingdom whose dawn they deemed to be just breaking. The fact that the adoption of the rite was attended by ecstatic manifestations identified by all as "the Spirit of Jesus," and by the highest-minded as tokens of the impartation of his *moral* disposition, is enough to prove that even before Paul the risen Christ was looked to as a personal Redeemer, a Saviour of individual souls from sin and death. The rite of baptism proves that Peter and other predecessors of Paul shared his overwhelming sense of moral unworthiness. They had not 'persecuted the Church,' but there was cause enough in the contrast at the great crisis of Calvary just past, between Jesus' faithfulness and their own cow-

ardly desertion. By this or some other means the sense of sin had come to so predominate over any previous, more worldly messianic expectations they may have entertained that the need most deeply felt was moral. They longed for personal redemption. They were more ready now to cry out: "Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord," than to ask: "Grant that we may sit one at thy right hand and one at thy left in thy glory." The adoption at this time of the rite of "baptism unto remission of sins" by the first followers of Jesus means that their old messianic ideas had been remoulded by the still regnant spirit of Jesus. In the tragedy of the cross they had been refined and purified as by fire. The adoption of this rite, and the experience of its attendant phenomena prove that Jesus' disciples had at last been brought over to his point of view. The essence of the expected kingdom was now to them also a direct and filial relation with God, and without a baptism of the Spirit they felt unprepared to walk in the

presence of the living God. Only as they became Christ's, not in word only, but in very life and fact and inward reality, could they be ready. If they proved themselves actually his in the same sense as when he had said in Galilee, "Whosoever will do the will of my Father, the same is my brother and sister and mother," then they might indeed expect with full assurance the forgiveness, the free entrance into the kingdom which he had promised in the name of the Heavenly Father to repentant publicans and harlots. Such considerations as these can alone account for their being now "baptized every one of them into the name of Jesus, *confessing their sins.*" And the awakening to this moral perception can be attributed to no other cause than contact with the spirit of Jesus, the man whose life had been lived in their presence as one who 'walked with God.'

There are those who think the critically sifted records of the resurrection appearances do not warrant the inference of any external objective factor.

Others think such a factor to be necessarily implied, even while they refuse to attribute to it qualities apprehensible to the senses, and hold open the unknown possibilities of discarnate spiritual action. Even this difference is not absolutely vital. The fundamental psychological fact is that these men were renewed—'saved'—by contact with the spirit of Jesus. Those who felt the experience believed it immediate and supernatural. Suppose it was in reality an unconscious echo and reflection of the days in Galilee. Still it was an experience of God "reconciling the world in Christ, not imputing unto men their trespasses." In short, the experience of personal redemption began even before Paul. And it began by contact with and knowledge of a Christ whose messianic work consists in making men after his own likeness "sons and daughters of the Highest."

III. From this consideration of the implications of the early adoption of the rite of baptism, and the real lessons to

be learned from the mythologic school of criticism, we turn to another aspect of the matter. For the mythologists, too, appeal to history, and in reality the Christ of mythology had a completer trying out in the second century than any which could be given today even to a modernized and rationalized Christ-myth.

With the baptism of water primitive believers experienced invariably a baptism of the Spirit of Jesus. Its outward and spectacular effects were temporary, as Paul foresaw they would be. Its abiding effects were, and still are, the essential phenomena of Christianity. They that have made themselves Christ's experience an adoption as sons into a fellowship with God like that of Jesus to the Father in heaven in whom his spirit rested. They become Christ-like. These are the essential, permanent phenomena in the history of Christianity. This is the psychology of religion in the stage to which it has been brought through the events of the evangelic story. Can we, or can we not, erect upon

these a permanent structure of absolute religion?

Certainly not without the historic life and death of Jesus to give meaning and content to the term "becoming Christ's." We have seen that the religious experience of Paul was conditioned by that of his predecessors who had known the historic Jesus. Paul's experience can be—should be—reinterpreted in the light of the psychology of religion as modern science understands the term. His phraseology and forms of thought, borrowed from Rabbinic Judaism and Hellenistic speculation, should be translated into the idiom of philosophy. But this translation, if worthily done, will not alter the fact. We shall still have before us a typical experience, expressive of the utmost reach of redemptive, or mystical, religion. Two thousand years is not a long time in the evolution of conscious personality, and I doubt if we can point to evidences of advance beyond the religious consciousness of Paul; though possibly we may have outgrown the phrase-

ology whereby he expresses it, such as "adoption," "apprehension of the life of God," "entrance into," or "laying hold upon," "the life that is hid with Christ in God." The reinterpretation of this typical Christian experience is a problem for religious psychology. We may safely leave it to those who have made a study of religious psychology in its ancient and its modern modes of expression. But those who propose to treat this as embodying the whole vital substance of our religion, if judged from the historian's point of view, are simply repeating the old error of the Greek ultra-Paulinists, the Docetic Gnostics of the sub-apostolic age, against whom the Church brought forward the rich treasures of its historic tradition of the teaching and life of Jesus, the Matthæan and the Petrine tradition.

Never was there an age of mythology like the era of the great Gnostics, Cerinthus, Basilides, Valentinus, Marcion. And their Gnosticism was not the artless indulgence of the poetic imagination to express religious and philosophic ideas

resorted to because the language of philosophy was still wanting. It represented the best psychology of the day. Gnosticism was not naïf. It was to the last degree conscious and artful. It collected from all the mythologies of antiquity imaginative expressions of the redemptive idea, and interwove with these the story of Calvary. The beginnings of this great ultra- (or pseudo-) Pauline movement called forth, as I have said, from the Palestinian branch of the Church, what we designate the Synoptic Literature, the Church's historic tradition, based on the authority of Matthew and Peter, of the teaching and work of Jesus. And this again led to a further development. From Ephesus, metropolis of the Pauline mission field, came forth in turn the third great element of the New Testament canon, the so-called Johannine literature, aiming to combine in due proportion the historic and the mystical elements of the faith. Later developments brought ever broader combination. Synoptic and Johannine tradition were placed side by side in the

'fourfold Gospel.' Extremes on both sides were discarded. Gnosticism was relegated to the same limbo as the anti-Pauline reformed Judaism of the Ebionites. The Church catholic followed instinctively the line of historic development, recognizing "neither Jew nor Greek," but only the "one new man in Christ Jesus."

If the history of religion can teach us anything it surely should teach us not to repeat the mistake of the post-apostolic age, when nearly one-half the Church was led off into the vague, speculative, eclectic theosophy of Gnosticism, rejecting the historic Jesus and the hope of a kingdom of God on earth in the vain endeavor to build religion upon psychological experience alone, regardless of the ethical impulse of the past. The line of historic advance was then what it is today, what it must continue to be so long as Christianity remains the flower of the religious spirit of East and West, Semite and Aryan, the social and the individual ideal.

The names Peter and Paul stand thus

for something vitally significant, something corresponding to the twofold aspect of our religion which combines in itself the individualism of the Hellenist and the nationalism of the Jew. The religious experience of Paul himself was conditioned upon the previous experience of those who before him had been baptized into the faith that Jesus is the Christ. They, too, like Paul, had gone through an experience which transformed their Jewish hopes of a national and social redemption into a new type of messianic hope, wherein individual fitness for eternal life in the presence of God was the primary consideration. This was the supreme effect of the tragedy of Calvary. But this effect would not have been attained, there would have been no resurrection hope, even of the lower type, had not the disciples learned through contact with the historic Jesus as the only way to the realization of this ideal such moral consecration as *his* precepts, *his* life, *his* death exemplified. Once and for all the ethical goal has been set for humanity in Jesus' doctrine

of the Kingdom: God's will to be "done on earth as it is in heaven." Eternal life in fellowship with God has been conditioned on the law of love and service. The consciousness that they had a gospel for the world came to Peter and those that were with him when they became aware that the Spirit of Jesus had brought them into a new relation with God.

The Petrine gospel, like the Pauline, has its local and temporary limitations. Those who at the founding of the Church were "baptized into the name of Jesus" conceived their relation to him under the forms of Judaism. They borrowed their phraseology from the prophecy of Daniel and from the one hundred and tenth Psalm. Doubtless they could give but a crude account, more or less figurative in form, of their own psychological experience, that experience which we call the Resurrection, and of which we can only say that directly or indirectly it was the operation upon their personality of the personality of Jesus, the 'manifestation,'

as they call it, of Jesus as 'Lord.' Their account of this is in fact dominated by the current ideas of the Davidic ruler exalted to sit at the right hand of God till his enemies be made his footstool. It is profoundly influenced by the apocalyptic figure of the 'Son of man' coming to judgment upon the clouds of heaven. These cruder ideas of the Jewish messianism developed since the Persian period under the pressure of Hellenistic persecution are at least as susceptible of reinterpretation as the more philosophic ideas of Paul, and they are already being rapidly transformed. What we have to remember is that both types of religious aspiration, the 'eschatological,' as it is technically termed, and the 'mythical,' stand for actual experiences which are repeated in successive generations of individuals and of the race. Even the more mystical experience, the consciousness of the 'twice-born,' has its roots in history. Men who today verify for themselves the inward sense for which New Testament writers supply the terms 'adoption,' 'sonship,' and

the like, pass through this experience not because of Isis, or Attis, or Dionysus, not because of mythical fancy or philosophical abstraction, but because of the historic Jesus, and by spiritual contact with him. It was the real impress of his personality that wrought the change in Peter. Dismiss from consideration, if you will, all possibilities of direct action from behind the veil of the discarnate spirit of Jesus on the soul of his penitent disciple; even so, I may still justly maintain that had Jesus' life and teaching been materially different from what we have been taught they were, this basic experience of Christian psychology would have been wanting. For Peter that experience voiced itself in the doctrine that "Jesus is the Christ." In a sense, Peter is the Rock on whom we all are builded. Subsequent experience, whether of Paul or of later generations, is conditioned by that which went before. The content of the term 'Christ' must vary. Paul did not mean by it precisely what Peter meant. He takes explicit pains to discriminate his sense

for the term from that it had to some of his predecessors. Our sense must differ from his. We do not and cannot mean by "the Christ" what either Peter meant, or Paul. But we retain the vital elements of their meanings with our own. Historic continuity is not sacrificed. Christianity will continue to be what it ever has been, the confession of Jesus as 'the Christ,' and in that confession each term is historic. The religion of the future must grow from the double stock of the national religion of Israel and the personality of Jesus.

I have reached the conclusion of my task. My effort has been to enable you to look at two significant movements of modern religious thought from the viewpoint of the historian of religion. Nineteenth Century 'Liberalism' and twentieth century 'Idealism' seem to me from this point of view in one respect alike. They both reflect only the periodic oscillation of the dominant religion of the world between the hereditary poles of its faith. We shall not swing beyond

our orbit. We shall progress along the line of true advance. But our progress will be swifter and surer if we learn by the broad experience of the past. Christianity is not only a social but also a personal religion. It is not only ethical but mystical; not only the gospel *of* Jesus, but also the gospel *about* Jesus. Perhaps I cannot better express it all than it is expressed in the two oldest and simplest prayers of the Church that we possess. They form the liturgy for the sacrament of the breaking of bread in the little manual of primitive church observance, discovered only a few years ago by Bryennios in Constantinople, and now preserved in Jerusalem, the so-called *Teaching of the Twelve Apostles.* These are the two prayers prescribed in it for the consecration of the broken bread; one a thanksgiving for the experience of personal redemption, the other a petition for the realization of the kingdom of God. The individual thanksgiving is this:

We thank thee, our Father, for the *life and the knowledge* which thou hast made known to us through Jesus thy Servant.

And to this the response is:

To thee be the glory forever.

The prayer for the kingdom of God is this:

Even as this broken bread was scattered over the hills, and when gathered became one loaf, so let thy Church be gathered together from the ends of the earth into Thy Kingdom.

The response of that ancient rubric will find echo in every Christian heart:

For thine is the glory and the power through Jesus Christ forever. Amen.

IV

OLD AND NEW IN THE CHARACTERIZATION OF JESUS

Pragmatism, the newest fashion in philosophy, defines "truth" to be the conception which "works." We need not wonder, then, that the same age which makes practical service the test of truth should declare the independence of Christianity from the historic Jesus. Will not myth produce the same result as fact, if accepted as fact? Will it not nourish aspiration, hope, faith, every religious disposition—yes, even when understood to be myth and not fact, if myth be defined as we have defined it—the pre-scientific expression of philosophic ideas? It may; but only in proportion as those ideas are understood to be 'true.' The philosophic ideas must correspond with observed fact. And this procedure brings us round to a complete reversal of the pragmatic princi-

ple. The ideas work because they are true. In proportion as they are felt to be lacking in objective reality independent of individual preference they lose their efficacy.

In point of fact, myth not only *may* produce the good fruits of religious and moral uplift. It *has* produced them. The age of the revival of myth, the age of the Hellenistic mystery religions, was an age of immense religious and moral uplift, as we have seen. The revolution out of which emerged Christianity victorious at last over paganism after three centuries of mortal conflict, was a transition of the civilized world to a higher level in matters of religion and ethics, a transition of vast importance, on the largest scale; and in that transition Christianity shared with its rival religions of the Orient the great conceptions of personal redemption, union with God, and immortality. A firm foundation in concrete historic fact was perhaps its chief point of superiority. The mystery religions united their adherents in loyalty to the cult-hero, and in effort for

personal and social redemption, in proportion as the myth could be made to seem real. Christianity triumphed over them in part perhaps because of its loftier ideals, but certainly to no small extent because of its manifestly better claim to historical reality. Jesus was an actuality. His redemptive career belonged not to the shadowy past of ancient fable, but to recent years. He had been "crucified under Pontius Pilate." The Gnostic sects which sacrificed history to myth, tangible fact to metaphysical idea, perished in spite of their greater conformity to the spirit of the times. The catholic faith, strongly buttressed upon historic tradition, survived. So then, while myth may serve—while it *has* served the cause of religious uplift, on condition and so long as its vague and shadowy symbolism bodied forth to the untutored imagination ideas and truths that could not otherwise obtain expression, yet fact is better than fiction. We of today do not stop with myth, claiming that it is true because it works. Neither do we utterly discard

myth or legend. We are ever seeking to understand it, to penetrate it, to get beyond it and beneath it, to the real objective fact which works because it is true.

It is this instinct for the objectively true which makes the Quest of the Historical Jesus a quest worth while. Ideal portraiture has its value. In ages of unquestioning faith nothing more is asked. The artist is not called upon to be historically realistic. If he express successfully his own soul's adoration, the worshipper takes the correspondence with historical fact for granted. Indeed, attempts at historical realism are resented. If photography could reproduce the face of Jesus as records can even now reproduce the voices of men no longer living, the feat would probably rouse the same antagonism today as was roused but yesterday by historical criticism of evangelic story. But historical criticism has made its way. The ages of authority and unquestioning faith are gone. A new age has succeeded, which appreciates better the value of

objective, ultimate fact. This age finds Christianity the leading religion of the world. It is an existing power, perhaps increasing, certainly potential. If the loyalty of all who are for the reign of right at the cost of sacrifice is ever to be concentrated into a world-redeeming power, it will be "in the name of Jesus"; for by impartial historic survey there is none other given among men whereby the world can or will be saved. Seeing Christianity, then, as it is, this critical, fact-loving, authority-disdaining age wishes to understand the power thereof, to study its development from the roots. The age has some regard for what the first disciples thought about Jesus, realizing that only through these beliefs can we come at the ultimate fact. But it has a greater regard for the fundamental fact, an instinctive appreciation that the deepest, most vital thing in Christianity is the personality of Jesus himself.

It must be admitted that the quest is difficult. The only documents we possess whose authorship is known, or whose date falls within a generation of

Jesus' life-time, are the greater Epistles of Paul. And the Epistles have only the scantiest allusions to the ministry of Jesus, no reference to any of his mighty works, and barely a half dozen to some of his less important sayings. Paul himself explicitly renounced the attempt to "know a Christ after the flesh." He intentionally directed all attention to "the Spirit," a present redemptive agency identical to his mind with "the Lord." If we accept the view of one of the ablest of New Testament scholars, well-known for a popular Life of Jesus as well as for a number of most scholarly technical works, even the personal character of Jesus was a matter of unconcern to Paul.

> It may be definitely affirmed that what we designate the moral and religious personal character of Jesus had no influence or significance whatever for the religious feeling (Frömmigkeit) of Paul.[1]

And yet the same writer is careful to point out that the distinctive feature in Paul's doctrine identifying the risen

[1] Bousset, *Kyrios Christos*, 1913, p. 143.

Lord with "the Spirit" was its moralizing and ethicizing effect. This resulted from an extension of control by the Spirit to the Christian's whole life. The ordinary view in Paul's day attributed the ecstatic phenomena of the gathering for worship, 'prophecy,' 'tongues,' 'miracles' and the like, to 'the Spirit.' Those thus gifted were designated "spiritual." Paul's view was that "if any man have not the Spirit of Christ he is none of his." He maintained that if a man did have this Spirit he must be "led by" it, everywhere and always. Christ must be "in him," and he "in the Lord." The life which he lived in the flesh must be no more his own, but Christ living in him. Whatsoever he did, in word or deed, he must "do all in the name of the Lord Jesus." And the characteristic feature in 'spirituality,' as Paul conceived it, was moral. Every manifestation was to be tested. It must be judged by a standard derived from the actual character of 'the Lord.' And the distinctive note is ministering 'love.' That is a veritable summing up of what

Paul elsewhere refers to as "the law of Christ," when in his farewell epistle he entreats the Philippians by their love for him and their loyalty to the Lord to have in them

> the mind which was also in Christ Jesus, who, being in the form of God, counted it not a booty to be lawlessly seized to be on an equality with God (like Adam, Gen. 3:1-5), but emptied himself, taking the form of a slave, being made in the likeness of men; and being found in fashion as a man he humbled himself, becoming obedient even unto death, yea the death of the cross.

This, then, is a characterization of Jesus. The Apostle who could rise superior to his time in its love of the spectacular and the marvellous, and declare that the abiding "gifts" of the Spirit were faith, and hope, and love, with love as "the greatest of these," had no small sense of the value of the moral as against the magical in his doctrine of the Spirit. And when Paul made it the supreme and only test of true discipleship that a man must have and be led by "the Spirit of Christ," always, and in "every word and deed," he surely had some very dis-

tinctly definable "moral and religious character" of Jesus in mind.

It is true that to Paul "the Spirit of Christ" is the incarnate Spirit of God, and in this sense there is weight in the objection that the personal religious and moral character of the historic Jesus was to him a matter of indifference. But it is easy to take such an affirmation in a very misleading sense. In reality it would have been impossible for Paul to make this identification of 'Lord' and 'Spirit,' if the actual personal character of the historic Jesus had not possessed in extraordinary degree the moral and religious qualities which are required in a universal ethical standard. It is also true that neither Paul, nor those to whom he commends "the mind that was in Christ Jesus," had personal knowledge of the details of Jesus' life. When, for example, in II Cor. 5:21 Paul refers to his own embassage of peace from God as having for its content the atoning sacrifice, and declares: "Him who knew no sin he made to be sin on our behalf; that we might become

the righteousness of God in him," it would be absurd to imagine enquiries on the part of Paul or his predecessors into the thirty unknown years of Jesus' life in Nazareth to ascertain its faultlessness. That would have been a quest almost as futile then as now. Only in the much later period of Johannine apologetic could the raising of such an issue seem anything less than a foolish provocation of Jewish opponents to blasphemy. In John 8:46; 9:24 ff. the question of Jesus' sinlessness is indeed actually brought into debate. This, however, is only later theological dialectic. The context of II Cor. 5:21, especially when compared with other Pauline references to the atonement, such as Rom. 4:25; 5:1, 9, 19, and more particularly still when compared with I Pt. 2:22-24, shows that Paul is simply applying to Jesus the attribute of the suffering Servant of Isa. 53:9, who (to adopt the rendering of I Pt. 2:22) "did no sin,[2] neither was guile found in his mouth."

[2] The LXX render the Hebrew word for sin by *ἀνομία*. II Cor. 5:21 and I Pt. 2:22 agree in rendering *ἁμαρτία*.

In short, Paul himself is no longer in immediate contact with the historical Jesus. This must be frankly admitted. He stands removed by at least one very important stage from the personality he reveres. He had "received" from others the doctrine that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures (I Cor. 15:4). And this doctrine certainly involves the viewing of Jesus' earthly character and fate from a more or less theoretical standpoint. Even so early as the time when Paul himself "received"[3] his impressions of the historic Jesus, they were already idealized, conventionalized, conformed to a theoretical standard. His "sinlessness," "humiliation," obedient suffering for others, and "exaltation," were traits of the suffering Servant of Isa. 52:13—53:12, who brings both Israel and the Gentile world into reconciliation with God by his martyrdom, and is thereafter "lifted up very high" and made to "divide the spoil of the strong."

[3] I Cor. 15:3, *παρέλαβον*; the word is the technical term for transmission of traditional teaching.

Whether Paul received this conception of Jesus as the 'suffering Servant' from the original Galilean disciples, or (as seems on philological grounds much more probable) from the early community or communities of Hellenistic believers, is a secondary question. The fact is undeniable that his conception of the historic Jesus has already passed through at least one stage of idealization. The admission may well seem unwelcome. If even one earliest witness is secondary, and presents a protrait already conventionalized, what value can attach to narratives of wholly unknown authorship, originating at a remove in time at least double that of the Pauline letters?

Modern criticism recognizes but two main sources of real and definite historical value in the evangelic literature of the early church, the Gospel of Mark, and the source combined with it on different principles by Matthew and Luke which critics designate by the symbol Q. The Gospel of John because of its late origin and didactic character cannot

be employed for the history of Jesus, though of incomparable value for the history of primitive belief about Jesus. The Book of Acts employs sources of greater value than the fourth Gospel for the earlier history of belief about Jesus; but again this is merely secondary. Of real attempts to describe the ministry of Jesus we have but Mark and Q, to set over against the scanty allusions of Paul; and neither Mark nor Q attempts a really historical pen-portrait. These are works of religious edification, not of critical history; defenses of the existing faith and practise of the community of believers whence they proceed, not impartial researches into their origins. They too have their theoretical conceptions of Jesus' character, career and fate, and set in relief what bears out the theory.

If, then, the quest be so perplexing and difficult, must not the result be too uncertain for real value? Must we not, however sadly, resign the attempt to characterize the historical Jesus? The answer to this question will largely

depend on the nature of the "value" sought. If it be that with which the secular historian is mainly concerned, the results which can be safely predicted will be meagre indeed. Not much more of Jesus' public activity, his teaching, career and fate, will be surely established than might be gleaned from the scanty references of Pliny, Tacitus, and Suetonius. But the secular values are not those which are now supposed to be in question. Religion does require a *true* portrait; and therefore every attainable trait of historical realism will be welcome. But it does not require a *physical* portrait. What it needs to know is the spiritual and moral element in the character of Jesus. *And the spirit survives.* A man's contemporaries are doubtless far better qualified than later generations to give the sensuous testimony of eye and ear. The lapse of but a few years will suffice in case of even the greatest men to obliterate the memory of mere physical characteristics unless memory be sustained by art. But for spiritual portraiture the later gener-

ation is apt to be the better qualified. On points of character we may often better rely on the judgment of the second or third generation than on that of the first. And in the case of the greatest qualities of all we are wont to find the rule a true one that "the things which are seen are temporal, the things which are not seen are eternal." Not the tangible facts, not the physical lineaments, remain; but that subtle, intangible, elusive thing we designate 'character.' Immortality, were it only of fame, belongs not to the body, but to the soul. From the standpoint of moral and spiritual values, as regards faith and hope and love, as regards personality and character, heroism, virility, stedfast devotion to principle and duty, Washington and Lincoln are better known today than to their contemporaries. And it is true not only of them but of all the truly great, of all whose greatness is inward and spiritual. The earthly house of this tabernacle is dissolved, but the inward man is renewed and glorified; it is clothed upon (to use Paul's mingled

metaphors) with a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens.

It is so with the character of Jesus. The traits which remain are traits of moral and religious value, for the obvious reason that those who became his disciples were concerned with these values, and only these. But the subordination—yes, even to disappearance—of the physical and temporary is far from invalidating the historicity of the spiritual and moral. It proves only the *relative* unimportance of the external. At a period so early as to evoke perpetual amazement, Jesus' followers felt that no other representation could do justice to his qualities of soul than to describe his career as incarnating every endowment of the Spirit of God.[4] He was apotheosized, and apotheosized by monotheistic Jews. Moreover, this apotheosis (to judge by our oldest and most trustworthy sources) was not because of

[4] This is the sense of the expression of Paul in Col. 1: 19: "It was the (divine) 'good pleasure' that the whole 'fulness' (of spiritual agencies) should dwell down in him"; and of Jn. 1: 14, 16. An early uncanonical gospel expresses it by saying, "The whole fountain-head of the Spirit descended on him."

marvellous deeds of power, which Paul never refers to, but mainly on the basis of moral qualities. If any say, But the apotheosis was a consequence of the resurrection; we reply, The apotheosis *was* the resurrection. Jesus could not have been "manifested as the Son of God with power by the resurrection from the dead" (Rom. 1:4), if to those who received the manifestation he had not first been known as one whose personality was worthy of such enthronement. In that transfiguring glory the memory of earthly individual traits could not long endure. Only that which was God-like in Jesus remained. But the God-like was not grafted in. The earthly dissolved away. As Paul felt regarding his own life, that it was "hid with Christ in God," so the personality of Jesus himself. Its traits of greatness were those that are "hid in God," and find their manifestation when that which is mortal has returned to earth, and the spirit has returned to God who gave it.

We must not, then, expect to find the

lesser traits of Jesus' character reflected in the records that remain. Paul and Mark and Q are our authorities, and none of these is a primary source. None aims to furnish the pen-portrait the historian covets. The most that criticism can effect is to identify the model in each case. For the conception of Paul is one, the conception of Mark is another, and the conception of Q is a third. Each is theoretic, because each is maintained in the interest of an identification of Jesus with one of the existing conceptions of Messiah and his work. Each is more or less affected by the intermingling of other theoretic ideals, so that we cannot speak of the Pauline as purely a doctrine of Christ as 'Lord,' of the Markan as purely a doctrine of Christ as 'Son of God,' of Q's as purely a doctrine of Christ as the incarnate 'Wisdom of God,' the suffering 'Servant.' They are only *predominantly* thus characterized.

But each is also historical. The titles, and the conceptions for which they stand, would not have been applied to

Jesus, or if applied would not have met the acceptance necessary to their survival, if they had not been felt to be appropriate. And the application was so early that those who made and those who accepted it could know by authentic report, if not from personal experience, to what degree the titles and ascriptions were in keeping with the life. In short, primitive Christology, with its titles and ascriptions, its symbols and its Scripture fulfilments, is the luminous haze through which the critic's eye must penetrate for outlines of the historic Jesus. Our dependence for any really authentic portrait must be on writers who had already enshrined him in the central sanctuary of their devotion. And for this purpose they used the symbols and forms of thought made sacred by long and hallowed use. As the sculptor (particularly the ancient sculptor) employs the conventionalized forms of the great artists of the past, often even rebaptizing old divinities under new names into the service of another faith, so the authors of our

Gospels, and the coiners of the primitive titles of the glorified Jesus, employed existing religious ideals and concepts, whose development the scholar must trace out if he would understand why they were deemed applicable and appropriate.

Such is the task to which scholars of various schools are today addressing themselves. For example, a study of the primitive titles of Christ forms the basis of the scholarly and thorough work of Bousset, entitled, *Kyrios Christos,* the most recent contribution to the subject. It is an essential factor in the outstanding treatise of Schweitzer, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus,* the representative work of the school of "consistent eschatologists," who account for the apotheosis of the crucified Galilean by attributing to Jesus himself the use of the title 'Son of man' as his own "favorite self-designation." Those who follow the lead of the "consistent eschatologists" disclaim all connection with psychopathic judgments of Jesus. They are careful to point out that an adop-

tion by John the Baptist and Jesus of the world-view of the writers of apocalypse, that somewhat morbid and degenerate type of later prophecy, does not involve forfeiture of our respect. Even if John and Jesus made the apocalyptic expectation of the impending world-cataclysm their own primary message, they will still be the representative religious leaders of a representative age. This may surely be granted. We may admit that even on grounds acceptable to the 'consistent eschatologist,' it will still be possible to look to the teaching of Jesus as uniquely great, even if delusive in any literal acceptation; and surely it will be possible still to cherish toward his person that supreme reverence and loyalty without which he cannot be for any of us the ultimate world-Redeemer. Acceptance—yes, unyielding advocacy—by Wesley of the current delusion of witchcraft scarcely affects our reverence for his religious leadership. So in the more vital instance. It *can* be said by great and loyal Christians that Jesus was an "ec-

static," a "visionary"; for great and loyal Christians, men whose faith is proved by their works, *have* said it, and continue to say it. But there are none such who can wish to say it; and those who accept the view can have little fault to find with a Munkácsy if (as protesting faith declares) he has "painted the Christ with the face of a fanatic."

The verdict of historical criticism cannot be swerved by clamor. Only evidence will affect it; and the world of faith must rest in its ancient loyalty while 'mythic' and 'eschatologist' weigh the relative significance of ancient titles and their use. Meantime it may be well to point out for 'the intelligent reader,' who is not a technical adept, what different characterizations of Jesus exist within the compass of the New Testament. Such differences are not apparent to eyes accustomed to read only from the viewpoint of the harmonist. When the assumption is that all sacred writers must say the same thing lest occasion be given to the enemy to blaspheme, comparisons are both odious and

sterile. If, however, we proceed upon the critic's assumption that the wider the contrast the broader the basis of judgment, comparison may be expected to yield results both ampler and more secure than indiscriminate acceptance.

It is, for example, a fact of no merely casual significance that the title Son of man, so pervasive in the Gospels, especially in the personal utterances of Jesus, utterly disappears in the Epistles, whether those of Paul, which so far antedate the Gospels, or in those of post-Pauline origin. Apart from the single occurrence in Acts 7:56 and one in Hegesippus' similar account of the martyrdom of James, the "favorite self-designation of Jesus" disappears as soon as we pass beyond the limits of Gospel literature.[5] There are grounds for believing the title 'Son of man,' and the conceptions involved in it, well known to Paul; for he employs (I Cor. 15:27) the Psalm passage (Ps. 8:7)

[5] It occurs once in a fragment of the *Gospel according to the Hebrews*. Hegesippus also is a Palestinian authority and used this Gospel.

applied in this sense by primitive believers,[6] and his doctrine of Christ as the "heavenly man" (I Cor. 15:49) and "last Adam" (I Cor. 15:45) is probably connected with rabbinic speculation regarding this transcendental Being of the apocalyptic writers. Moreover he thinks of Jesus as agent of the impending judgment of God. The Thessalonians had been taught in his message of evangellization "to wait for God's Son from heaven, even Jesus, who delivereth us from the wrath to come," the Corinthians are warned that all "must stand before the judgment seat of Christ." These are doctrines involving an identification of Jesus with the apocalyptic figure of Dan. 7:9, 13f., the "one like unto a son of man," that is, one in human form, representative of Israel, as against the monsters who are declared to represent temporary and hostile king-

[6] The author of Hebrews (85-90 A. D.) employs the two Scriptures used by Paul in I Cor. 15: 25-27 as the basis of his Christological argument, viz., Pss. 8 and 110. Ps. 8 is the basis of his argument that Christ as the Son and human, is higher than angels, Heb. 2: 5-18.

doms. This mysterious Son of man, who in the vision of Daniel is brought "on the clouds of heaven" to the divine presence, occupies there one of the "thrones of judgment" and enters upon his "everlasting dominion." He figures to some extent in later apocalypses, also, and is certainly meant in the title which plays so large a part in the Gospels, though its meaning there is already taken for granted, not explained. The idea is also present *by implication* in Paul, in spite of the entire absence of the title; but the whole conception remains in the background of his thought. It is not a leading idea. The prophecies of the Son of man are never appealed to. It is barely possible in the single instance of I Cor. 15:27 to detect an allusion to Ps. 8:7. There is no reference to Daniel, and *no suggestion that Jesus had ever given utterance to the claim on his own behalf.* The conclusion is irresistible that the doctrine is rather admitted than advanced by Paul. It does not furnish the soil for his own Christological thinking, which is rooted in

the Wisdom literature of Alexandrian Judaism rather than in the Palestinian apocalyptic. In general, the phenomena of Pauline usage are altogether opposed to the idea that Jesus' own message was *primarily* eschatological, or that he himself made the title Son of man his own "favorite self-designation."

These are certainly important and significant facts in the Christology of Paul, our earliest and most authentic witness. But their bearing on the question of the character of the historical Jesus is indirect, and principally negative. Our doubts of the claim of the 'consistent eschatologists' to hold the key to the entire problem are very decidedly strengthened, but Paul's attitude toward the 'Son of man' doctrine throws very little light on the personal character of Jesus.

The case is similar in one respect with another messianic title rarely applied to Jesus in early Christian literature, but associated with a circle of ideas at once so distinctive, so fundamental and so irresistibly attested, that its primi-

tive currency is undeniable. It is the title 'Servant' or 'Child of God' (παῖς θεοῦ), derived from the poems of the post-exilic Isaiah, wherein this figure of the Servant—for the Hebrew term *ebed Yahweh* has not the double sense of its Greek rendering παῖς κυρίου —is employed of the martyr-people, scattered among the nations without inheritance, like Levi among the tribes, a priest-nation endowed only with knowledge of the true God, but destined "by his knowledge" to "justify many." In his humiliation judgment was taken away from him, he was smitten, afflicted, despised, oppressed. This, however, was willingly suffered for the transgression of God's people; and not only of these, but even of the Gentiles. These had been astonished at his affliction, but they would come to the light of his rising, and be sprinkled with the purifying drops of his "sin-offering." Thus, whereas he had been brought low, "despised and rejected of men," the 'Servant' would be "exalted and be very high," he would be given a portion with the great, and

would distribute the spoil of the strong: "because he poured out his soul unto death, and was numbered with the transgressors, and bare the sin of many, and made intercession for the transgressors."[7]

Like the title 'Son of man,' the title 'Servant of God' is completely wanting from the Pauline Epistles. It is almost wholly wanting from the New Testament, occurring but four times, all four in a special section of the Book of Acts. And yet we have the explicit testimony of Paul himself that the *doctrine* formed part of the fundamental gospel "received" by himself and preached in common by all (I Cor. 15:4). Even without this explicit statement we might have inferred from the subtle allusions and

[7] In the above paraphrase the rendering of the Septuagint has been followed where it seems to control the thought of Paul; e.g., "divide the spoil of the strong ones" (Is. 53:12; cf. Col. 2:15). The figure of the "kingdom of priests" (Ex. 19:6) controls from Is. 52:15 to 53:12. The "pouring out" of the life-blood, "bearing (literally "lifting off") the sin of many," and "making intercession for the transgressors" represent the function of the priest in the "sin-offering"; cf. Lev. 9:9, 18-24, and Rom. 4:25; 5:1, 9; 8:34; II Cor. 5:21; Eph. 5:2, etc.

echoed Isaian phrases in Paul's epistles that he applied the Isaian figure of the suffering Servant to Jesus, just as is more openly done in I Pt. 2:21-25. But the absence of explicit use is even more remarkable in this case than in that of the title Son of man. Nowhere does Paul appeal to the prophecy, nor openly cite it. The whole conception remains in the background of his thought; this time, fortunately, accompanied by an explicit statement that it did belong to the common primitive "received" belief.

The case differs, however, from that of the title 'Son of man' and its group of connected ideas, in that the Isaian figure of the 'Servant' has an earthly ministry, a human character; whereas the Danielic 'Son of man' has none. The characteristics of the Servant are unmistakably distinctive. "Meekness of wisdom" is his salient attribute. Unselfish service, uncomplaining acceptance of wrong, humble obedience to the will of God, even unto death, service not of friends alone, but of enemies, even to the

pouring out of his life-blood for their forgiveness. These are the distinctive characteristics of the Servant. The law of his action is to "bear others' burdens." The "mind" that is in him is that which "seeks not its own," but "beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things." It "suffereth long and is kind"; it "envieth not," it "vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, is not provoked, taketh not account of evil, rejoiceth not in unrighteousness but rejoiceth with the truth." In short, it is a spirit of the wisdom of God, peaceable, and easy to be entreated, a spirit of faith and hope, but above all things and everlastingly it is a spirit of unselfish, ministering *love*.

Can it be doubted *whose* spirit Paul has in mind when he defines to the wonder-loving Corinthians which are the greater, the abiding "gifts of the Spirit"? If doubt there could be, then we should appeal to the few but significant direct characterizations of Jesus in his writings, the reference to the "meekness and gentleness of Christ"

(II Cor. 10:1), the declaration that "Christ also pleased not himself, but as it is written, the reproaches of them that reproached thee fell upon me" (Rom. 15:3), the appeal to "the law of Christ" in Gal. 6:1f. as involving rulership "in a spirit of meekness" for the help of the weak. We should appeal to the whole depiction in Phil. 2:1-11 of the second Adam, who not vaingloriously "seeking his own things," nor counting it (like the first Adam) "a booty to be lawlessly seized to be equal with God," "humbled himself and took on him the form of a slave,[8] and became obedient unto death, yea, even the death of the cross." With all due reserve as to questions of derivation and authorship, we should add also the word of Jesus cited in Paul's farewell address to the elders of the Ephesian Church (Acts 20:35) as summing up the whole spirit of the Master's primacy: "Ye ought to help the

[8]Even here, Phil. 2:7, the Greek word is not the ambiguous παῖς = 'servant,' 'child,' but δοῦλος 'slave,' corresponding to the Septuagint rendering of Is. 53:11, 'doing good service as a slave for many' (εὐ δουλεύοντα πολλοῖς.)

weak, and to remember the words of the Lord Jesus, how he himself said, It is more blessed to give than to receive.''

This embodies practically all that the Pauline writings afford[9] to throw light upon the character of Jesus as Paul understood it. It is not intended to furnish a pen-portrait. It is not specific or detailed. It has the defect (if defect it be) that it follows a conventional model. Paul is thinking of Jesus *in the character* of the 'suffering Servant' of Isaiah. But how else should we expect the character of Jesus to impress itself on the men through whom we come in touch with him, than in the mould of such conventionalized forms? Is Paul really thinking only of an abstraction when he says, ''I live in the faith of the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself up for me,'' because the phraseology (παραδόντος ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ) is borrowed from Is. 53:6 and 12? Is this deep sense of personal devotion kindled

[9] ''The forbearance'' or ''long-suffering'' of Jesus is referred to in I Tim. 1:16; but the direct Pauline authorship is more than doubtful. The agreement of this allusion with the rest is, however, worth noting.

by the thought that the martyr-people, the suffering Servant of the post-exilic poem, had suffered for Paul's sake; or that *Jesus of Nazareth* had so suffered? Grant that Paul thinks of Jesus in the character of the Servant, this at least is sure: If the character of the historic Jesus had not been distinguished for the traits of "meekness and gentleness," unselfish generosity, forbearance, ministering and forgiving love, the effort to present him in this character would not have met success. It could not, then, have been part of the primitive "received" Christology that he was the suffering Servant of the Isaian poem who "died for our sins according to the Scriptures." Doubtless critical accuracy will demand that some discount be made on the score of idealizing conformation to the conventional type representative of the martyr-people. Still we can hardly affirm that Paul has left us in the dark as to "the moral and religious personal character of Jesus"; or that it "had no influence or significance" for his religious feeling, when he de-

clared "As many as are led by the Spirit of God they are the sons of God. . . . . If any man have not the Spirit of Christ he is none of his." When he held up the standard of the true and abiding "gifts of the Spirit" as being such as are defined in the great lyric of love of I Cor. 13, the delineation of Christlikeness was at least sufficiently definite for the needs of religion. Paul did "know him whom he had believed," and though this knowledge was not "after the flesh," yet he has given meaning to the term "the spirit of Christ," a meaning which is not useless for lack of moral precision.

It is a wholly different conception which predominates in the Gospel of Mark and extends from it into the two other Gospels which base their *narrative* element almost exclusively upon Mark. Here, as in Paul, the title 'Servant of God' is completely wanting, and even the conception has left but the scantiest verbal traces. There is no specific appeal to the Isaian prophecy, and scarcely a reference to any *scriptural*

prediction of Jesus' fate; though Jesus repeatedly predicts his own fate, and in detail.[10] But in two instances (Mk. 10: 45 and 14: 24) the language and thought in combination show that the suffering Servant who bears the sin of "many" in his death is remembered in connection with the sacrament. Elsewhere the Gospel of Mark contains scarcely a trace of this Isaian conception of Jesus. It has no occurrence of the words for 'meekness' and 'gentleness,' nor any of their cognates. Humility is never predicated of Jesus, nor is anything said of his forbearance and long-suffering of evil. There is no attempt to present him in the rôle of the Servant as proclaiming glad tidings to the poor. His distinctive and characteristic trait in Mark is "authority." He looks round upon the narrow and intolerant scribes

[10] The references to *scriptural* prediction are Mk. 9: 12b and 14: 21, neither reference giving any clear indication what "Scripture" is in mind. The former passage is rightly judged by most critics (so Bousset, *Kyrios Christos,* p. 7f.) to be an early gloss. It does not appear in Luke and is transposed in Mt. 17: 12 to its logical position. The sense requires that it should stand *after* verse 13. It seems to have crept in from the margin at the wrong place.

"with anger, being grieved at the hardening of their heart" (3:5). For those who had said he had "an unclean spirit" he has a warning of "sin that hath never forgiveness" (3:29). From the superscription: "The beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ the Son of God" (Mk. 1:1)[11] to the exclamation of the centurion at the cross, couched in the phraseology of heathen myth, "Truly this was *a* son of God" (Mk. 15:39), Mark presents his central figure in 'heroic' proportions. The 'mighty works' of Jesus occupy the foreground; the 'words of grace' of Lukan story have almost disappeared. There is no Sermon on the Mount, no discourse on True Wealth, none on Prayer, none on the Forgiving Father. The two Markan examples of Jesus' teaching are the chapter of parables (Mk. 4), interpreted by the evangelist (verses 10-12) as a preaching of judgment against those who 'having eyes see not, and having ears hear not' and the

[11] Some ancient authorities omit "the Son of God"; but the conception reappears frequently in the Gospel.

utterance of doom upon Jerusalem (Mk. 13). The title, 'Son of man,' is freely employed (in utterances of Jesus), but never explained. It seems as much in the background as in Paul. The title—or rather the conception—to which all leads up is introduced by Jesus himself at a significant point. It is at the conclusion of the long chapter of disputing in the temple (Mk. 12). Successively Pharisee, Sadducee, and scribe have advanced, put their question, and retired discomfited. "No man, after that," says the evangelist, "durst ask him any question." It is now Jesus' turn to take the aggressive.

> And Jesus answered and said, as he taught in the temple: How say the scribes that the Christ is the son of David? David himself said in the Holy Spirit:
> The Lord said unto my Lord,
> Sit thou on my right hand
> Till I make thine enemies the footstool of thy feet.
> David himself calleth him LORD; and whence is he his son?

We have met before in Paul a repeated employment of Ps. 110: 1 as ap-

plying to the exaltation of Jesus to "the right hand of God," and in Acts 2:34, where again it applies to the "ascending into the heavens." We need not here repeat the arguments employed elsewhere[12] to show what others have contended for on other grounds, that this citation cannot be an authentic utterance of Jesus in regard to himself. It is the evangelist's adaptation of a 'messianic' Scripture, directed primarily against the Jews, but also showing his attitude toward that narrower conception of Jesus which expressed itself in the title 'Son of David.' 'Christ,' or 'Son of God,' rather than 'Lord' is Mark's distinctive messianic title; but this paragraph fully expresses his own Christology, and sounds the keynote for his own conception of Christ. Jesus, from the time of his adoption by the Spirit[13] and the heavenly Voice, became a superhuman authority. He already

[12] Bacon, *Beginnings of Gospel Story*, p. 175; cf. Bousset, *Kyrios Christos*, p. 51.

[13] Mark uses the title 'Son of man' frequently, but without explanation of its meaning. He seems to regard it as involving an enigmatic claim of authority.

sits at the right hand of God, from henceforth expecting until his enemies be made the footstool of his feet. There is more of defiance than of humility in the parting word of Jesus to the assembled "chief priests and scribes and elders of the people" when, according to Mark, in answer to the challenge of the high priest: "Art thou the Christ, the son of the Blessed?" he answers:

> I am: and ye shall see the Son of man sitting at the 'right hand of power' and coming with the 'clouds of heaven.'

The whole Gospel of Mark is a characterization of Jesus. It is written for that purpose far more than to convey his teaching. The traits we have emphasized in the portrait are indeed not the only ones. Jesus receives the little ones, rebuking the disciples who would forbid them, looks lovingly on the kneeling figure of the rich young man, sets the example of unselfish devotion unto death for the "ransom of many." But the *salient* traits in the Markan portrait are traits of heroism, virility, and power.

The contrast between this conception and that of Paul could hardly be stronger within the limits of fidelity to historic fact.

And true to fact it is. We may even say that the fate of Jesus at the hands of Jewish and Roman authorities would be unaccountable had his character and career been only such as delineated by Paul. Certainly the stormy and impetuous devotion of his followers, which within a few days of the tragedy of Calvary had already acclaimed him as "seated at the right hand of power," and about to "come with the clouds of heaven," would be utterly unaccountable. But the historicity is not apart from idealization. Mark, too, has his ideal conception of "the Christ the Son of God" and gives what he has of current historical tradition in the manner and to the extent that will best subserve the identification. This, too, belongs to the nature of the source; but it does not invalidate the testimony. Mark's story of Jesus' career has little to tell of the inward man. But it throws

new light upon it by giving the character its setting. Little indeed should we know of Jesus as he was, but for the Gospel of Mark.

And lastly there is Q. The work of critical analysis is still so incomplete that one can hardly speak with assurance. And yet the leading facts are assured. It is an older source than Mark, older perhaps than the greater epistles of Paul. And it is by no means a mere collection of the precepts of Jesus. Critics have maintained, on grounds not convincing to the present writer, that it had no story of the passion and resurrection. But as to its introduction of the person and work of Jesus there can be no dispute. It not only began its story of Jesus' career with an account of his baptism and temptation, but placed the nature of his ministry in explicit contrast with the Baptist's, reproaching the generation which was "stumbled in him," because it called the one 'demon-ridden," and the other "a glutton, a friend of publicans and sinners." Q not only characterizes

Jesus' career and ministry. It places it in careful, systematic antithesis to the 'eschatological' ministry of John. The Baptist had come like Jonah to the Ninevites crying, Yet forty days and Nineveh shall be destroyed. His ministry was a sign from God to an unbelieving generation, but not the greatest sign. The works of mercy and grace, the glad tidings to the poor, forgiveness and restoration, the winning gracious appeal of a divine Father's love, which constituted the ministry of Jesus, were "a greater matter than Solomon," a final plea of "the Wisdom of God" whose function is to seek out and save the erring. "Wisdom's children" receive it.[14]

The conception of Jesus presented in Q is that of the Servant of God who is the incarnation of His redeeming Spirit of Wisdom. This was made evident in its opening scenes. Its account of his

[14] In this paraphrase of the Q discourse on Israel's 'stumbling' at the Christ (Mt. 11 and Lk. 7: 18-35), it has been assumed without the demonstration published elsewhere (Bacon, *Sermon on the Mount*, p. 232) that the Sign of Jonah had original reference to the ministry, not of Jesus, but of the Baptist.

baptism (if we may judge from surviving remnants) was framed on the model of the Isaian scene of the calling of the Servant-son, endowed with the spirit of divine wisdom. We have reason to believe the rendering of the Isaian passage (Is. 42:1-4) was that employed in Mt. 12:18-21 for another purpose:

Behold my Servant (παῖς) whom I have chosen,
My Beloved on whom my soul fixed her choice;
I will put my Spirit upon him,
And he shall proclaim judgment to the Gentiles.
He shall not strive nor cry,
Nor shall any hear his voice in the streets,
A bruised reed will he not break,
Nor smoking flax will he quench,
Till he bring forth judgment unto victory;
And in his name the Gentiles shall hope.

The Markan story of the descent of the Spirit on Jesus at his baptism and the Voice from heaven proclaiming "Thou art my Son, the Beloved, on whom my soul fixed her choice" is but a pragmatized form of the Isaian conception, just as the story of the tempta-

tion which followed is abbreviated and reduced to hard and concrete fact in the two verses Mk. 1 : 12f. In Q a threefold contrast is drawn between the career of the Servant-son as conceived by men, and as conceived by the wisdom of God. In two of the three the figure of the Servant-son is the Isaian, as reproduced and developed in the pre-Christian Alexandrian writing, the Wisdom of Solomon, where the title is used not in the sense of 'Servant,' but 'Son' of God and interchangeably with υἱός, as a designation of Israel, God's agent for "giving the race of men the incorruptible light of the law."[15] Here we read of Israel's forty-year temptation in the wilderness, where they had lived by God's "all-nourishing bounty,"

That thy sons whom thou lovedst, O Lord, might learn
That it is not the growth of earth's fruits that nourisheth men,
But that thy word preserveth them that trust thee.[16]

[15] Sap. 18 : 4.
[16] Sap. 16 : 25f.

And still more distinctly does the description of Israel's humiliation as the martyr-people in Wisdom 2:12-20 present the lesson of the Gospel temptation of the "Son" to expect supernatural aid. In Wisdom 2:12-20 the wicked say of Israel, the Servant-son:

Let us lie in wait for the Righteous man,
Because he is of disservice to us
And is contrary to our works
And upbraideth us with sins against the law
And layeth to our charge sins against our discipline.
He professeth to have knowledge (γνώσις) of God
And nameth himself Servant (παῖς) of the Lord.
He became to us a reproof of our thoughts.
He is grievous unto us even to behold,
Because his life is unlike other men's,
And his paths are of strange fashion.
We were accounted of him as base metal,
And he abstaineth from our ways as from uncleannesses.
The latter end of the righteous he calleth happy
And he vaunteth that God is his father.
Let us see if his words be true,
And let us try what shall befall in his ending.

For if the Righteous man is God's son (υἱός),
He will uphold him
And He will deliver him out of the hand of
his adversaries.
With outrage and torture let us put him to
the test
That we may know his gentleness
And may test his patience under wrong.
Let us condemn him to a shameful death,
For he shall be visited according to his words.

What Q presented as the career and fate of "the Son of God" might be inferred from the temptation-story with its rejection of "the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them," and its acceptance of hunger and danger as the predestined way that the Son of God must go. But we are not left to conjecture as to the nature of this career. It is the typical career which in the Alexandrian Wisdom literature belongs to the spirit of divine Wisdom incarnate in a series of servants (παῖδες) of the Lord from Noah to Solomon. When in Q (Mt. 11:25-30 and Lk. 10:21f.) there is placed in the mouth of Jesus a typical Hymn of Wisdom celebrating the knowledge of God given to "the Son," and

commending it in phraseology taken largely verbatim from the Wisdom writers[17] to "babes," this is meant as a commendation of the teaching of Jesus as a whole. It is the yoke of the lowly and meek. It offers eternal rest to the soul. The poem can hardly have stood elsewhere in Q than at the conclusion of Jesus' teaching. And when in the same Q source a typical Wisdom-plaint is also used (Mt. 23:34-39 and Lk. 11:49-51; 13:34f.), denouncing the unbelieving generation whose hands are stained with the blood of the prophets, and especially Jerusalem, vainly visited with repeated loving entreaty, Jerusalem whose house is now forsaken of its divine tenant, we cannot be in doubt as to the kind of fate suffered by "the Son of God" whom the Baptism and Temptation had so poetically introduced upon the scene. It is almost a superfluous note when one of our two reporters of the ancient Gospel makes the utterance in express terms

[17] On the literary relations of Mt. 11:25-30, see especially Von Norden, *Agnostos Theos*, 1913, pp. 277-308.

a quotation from "The Wisdom of God."[18]

In short, the Q source goes further than any in the characterization of Jesus as regards his "personal religious and moral character," and at the same time goes to at least equal length in the employment of a conventional ideal. In the Alexandrian Wisdom literature the Isaian suffering Servant had become Israel the Servant-son,[19] whose prerogative was to be the 'dwelling-place' of the divine Wisdom-Spirit. In Q this conception was applied to Jesus, whose martyr-career exemplified the ideal of Isaiah and of the Alexandrian poets as well. Were idealization indeed fatal to historic truth, then Q's idealized portrait of Jesus would be but a dream, to place beside the fainter outline we derive from Paul, and the cruder from Mark. But there are critical grounds cogent enough to win from scholars as able and as di-

[18] Lk. 11: 49.

[19] Παῖς and *υἱός* are used interchangeably in Wisdom of Solomon. The sense of 'servant' (Heb. *ebed*) is lost. The dropping of *παῖς* in favor of the unambiguous *υἱός* is the final third stage.

verse in their views as Pfleiderer and Harnack the belief that the greater Pauline letters themselves show literary dependence upon Q.[20] This remains one of the problems of criticism. For the present let the fact suffice that with Q we return to a conception of the character of Jesus which like that of Paul is fundamentally based on the Isaian figure of the suffering Servant of God, who by his knowledge justifies many, making his soul an offering for sin.

At the date to which a gospel source must be assigned that if not employed by Paul himself was certainly largely employed by both Matthew and Luke, and only less certainly, though scantily and crudely, by Mark, the adoption of such an ideal as the basis of a characterization of Jesus is not within the province of poetic fancy. Had it not corresponded with actual recollection it could

[20] The passage in question is the famous Hymn of Wisdom above referred to, Mt. 11: 25-30 and Lk. 10: 21f., compared with I Cor. 1: 18-25; 2: 1. See Harnack, *Sprüche u. Reden Jesu,* p. 210, n. 1, quoting Pfleiderer, *Urchrist,* I², p. 435f. [Eng. Transl., *The Sayings of Jesus,* p. 301, note 1.]

not have survived. It is this characterization of Paul and what we might call the 'Hellenistic,' perhaps even the 'Alexandrian,' gospel source, which holds foremost place in all the writings of the sub-apostolic age not actually based upon the Gospel of Mark itself. It must be placed alongside the Markan, its sane and sober view of the ministry, its more poetic and mystical doctrine of Christ's person and the significance of his suffering must be weighed along with the eschatological and "wonder-loving" Mark, if we would form a just and consistent and worthy conception. Only thus can we appreciate the historic Jesus, as he was in his moral and inward character.

Is this historic Jesus, dimly and yet truly and surely seen through the transfiguring haze of love and adoration, a true Redeemer of the world? That question will be answered as we answer one more practical and real: Is his doctrine of the kingdom ultimate as a social, his doctrine of sonship ultimate as an individual, ideal? If so, their representative

is one in whom loyalty can never meet disappointment. Their representative is "Christ Jesus, who before Pontius Pilate witnessed the good confession."

The End.

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